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The starting point of my project is the deeply rooted tension between our everyday pre-theoretic 
experience of time and our leading metaphysical and physical theories of time.  Prime examples 
of this tension can be found both in discussions surrounding the ontology of the past, present, 
and future and debates over the fundamental nature of the passage and direction of time.  When it 
comes to the existence of the past, present, and future, our pre-theoretic experience informs us 
that the present is more special than the past and the future.  The present is now, our lives play 
out in the present, and everything that we directly experience comes from the present.  The past 
and the future, in contrast, appear somehow less “real” than the present and seem to us mere 
shadows in comparison to the vividness of the present.  Our best physical theories, however, 
arguably provide little support for our feeling that the present has a different ontological status 
than the past and the future.  Further, while it feels like time really passes, a physical description 
of temporal passage is both absent from and widely taken to be incompatible with the science of 
our world.  Lastly, although it seems that time has a direction insofar as we, for example, 
remember the past but not the future, there has been much debate over whether the direction of 
time is in fact a genuine feature of our world.  Resolving these and other issues is a central and 
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While united by the search for the correct understanding of the relationship between, on the one 
hand, our experience and, on the other hand, the metaphysics and science of time, my project is 
divided into four separate papers.  In what follows, I provide a brief summary of each paper.   
   
Temporal Passage in a Fragmented World looks at the relationship between fragmentalism and 
the passage of time.  As it was introduced by Fine in “Tense and Reality” (2005)1, fragmentalism 
is an A-theoretic view that divides the world into incompatible fragments of tensed facts.  I begin 
by explaining how the Fineian fragmentalist can respond to claims that their theory is only able 
to offer an irredeemably incoherent account of time.  I then argue that, even if sense can be made 
of the general picture of time it presents, Fineian fragmentalism is unable to supply a passable 
account of the mind-independent passage of time in line with our experience.  The conclusion 
from this will be that Fineian fragmentalism is a subpar tensed A-theoretic account.  Lipman 
(2018)2 provides a recent modification of Fineian fragmentalism based in a tenseless 
fragmentalist framework.  My suggestion, however, is that Lipman’s attempt to supply a 
tenseless account of genuine fragmentalist temporal passage is ultimately unmotivated.  One 
underexplored possible option open to the fragmentalist is to argue that time does not really pass 
in a fragmented universe. 
 
 
1 Fine, K. (2005). Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
2Lipman, M.A. (2018). A Passage Theory of Time. In K. Bennett & D.W. Zimmerman (Eds.). Oxford Studies in 
Metaphysics: Volume 11 (95-122). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
iii 
 
Norton’s Objective Temporal Passage considers one unique solution to the puzzle of temporal 
passage in the block universe.  Norton (2010)3 argues that, although a precise description of its 
workings is currently beyond our understanding, time really passes.  After introducing Norton’s 
account, I argue that it both implies a counterintuitive relationship between the “now” and 
passage and that it leads to an unlikely relationship between our experience and reality.  I then 
propose that, even if one is willing to accept these consequences, there is reason to question 
whether Norton builds a convincing case for the claim that, since we are not able to find any of 
the identifying characteristics of an illusion in the case of temporal passage, the passage of time 
is not an illusion. 
 
A Defense of the B-Theoretic, Block Universe offers a defense of the B-theoretic, block universe 
theory of time.  I begin by motivating the connection between, on the one hand, the B-theory and 
the block universe and, on the other hand, the A-theory and dynamic views such as presentism.  
With this connection in place, I argue that the overall weight of experiential, metaphysical, and 
scientific considerations support the B-theoretic, block universe.  My conclusion is that, although 
there is reason to favor the B-theoretic, block universe over A-theoretic, dynamic views, there 
are still important and unanswered questions surrounding the B-theoretic, block universe. 
 
Non-Dynamic Temporal Passage presents an account of the mind-independent and non-dynamic 
passage of time that is consistent with the block universe theory and central features of our 
experience of time.  In explaining the passage of time, I appeal to the temporal boundaries of the 
 




block universe and argue that the passage of time explains both the earlier than relation and the 
direction of time.  Although a minimalist account of temporal passage, it provides substantial 
answers to the following core questions about temporal passage:  What is the basis of the passage 
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Look back on Time, with kindly eyes –  
He doubtless did his best –  
How softly sinks that trembling sun 
In Human Nature's West  
 
― Emily Dickinson 
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Fragmentalism is a relatively recent and striking addition to the debate between tensed and 
tenseless theories of time.  As originally introduced by Fine (2005 and 2006), fragmentalism 
takes its place in the corner of tensed theories.  The metaphysics of Fineian fragmentalism 
divides a world that is on the whole incurably incoherent into internally coherent fragments of 
tensed facts.  One of the professed strengths of tensed A-theoretic accounts, such as presentism4, 
is that they are able to account for the intuitive, everyday feeling that time really passes.  B-
theoretic tenseless accounts, on the other hand, are usually thought to accord better with the 
science of our world5 and are typically paired with the much less intuitive view that the passage 
of time is an illusion6.   
My aim is to consider if and in what sense fragmentalism can capture the mind-
independent reality of temporal passage.  After a short introduction to fragmentalism, I provide a 
general argument that Fineian fragmentalism is neither able to accommodate the genuine global 
 
4 Presentism holds that only the present exists and time passes insofar as the present changes or renews itself.  It is 
often thought to get at the feeling we have that, on the one hand, the past and future are somehow less real than the 
present and, on the other hand, the passage of time is inextricably bound to the moving of events and things from the 
future into the present and then continuously on into the further and further depths of the past.  For more on 
presentism, see Prior (1970) or Zimmerman (2005 & 2008). 
5 See, for example, Callendar (2017), Dainton (2010), or Silberstein et al. (2018).  
6 For exceptions to this trend see Maudlin (2007) or Mozersky (2015).  Defending the block universe, which 
incorporates the eternalist ontology of time, Maudlin believes that the passage of time is a real and irreducible part 
of the block.  Along similar lines, Mozersky is a B-theorist who argues that the passage of time is a mind-
independent phenomenon that is to be understood in terms of the earlier than relation and its relationship to change.  
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nor local passage of time7.  I then respond to a proposal for a tenseless fragmentalist version of 
mind-independent temporal passage presented by Lipman (2018) and argue that it is 
unmotivated.  My conclusion will be both that Fineian fragmentalism lacks the advantages of 
orthodox A-theoretic tensed accounts and that there is no convincing reason to endorse a 
tenseless theory of genuine temporal passage over standard A-theoretic and B-theoretic accounts 
of the passage of time. 
 
2. A World in Fragments. 
First introduced by Fine in “Tense and Reality” (2005), fragmentalism is a rare instance of both a 
theoretically intriguing and novel theory of time.  Fine’s suggestion is that, if one endorses a 
tensed A-theoretic account, then one ought to be a fragmentalist.  One way to initially approach 
Fineian fragmentalism is to provide a simplified and intuitive reading of the seemingly 








Figure 1.  General Idea Behind Fineian Fragmentalism.   
 
7 Throughout this paper, I will be using ‘mind-independent temporal passage’ as synonymous with ‘genuine 
temporal passage’.  Both characterizations are meant to capture our everyday notion of the passage of time as an 























As depicted in figure 1, a plausible way to think of the general idea behind Fineian 
fragmentalism is to begin by imagining, as best as one can, the world sub species aeternitatis.  
From this vantage point, the world is to be sectioned into momentary temporal slices, which are 
represented by M1-M4 in figure 1.  Next, imagine that each of these temporal slices includes 
tensed facts about every entity and event in the world.  This means that there will be a vast 
number of tensed facts, such as it is the case that the Berlin Wall is standing and it is the case 
that the Berlin Wall will no longer be standing, composing each individual momentary temporal 
slice.  Finally, each of the temporal slices should be considered a reality in itself.    
In order to add some precision to the rough picture of fragmentalism just presented, we 
can turn to the details of Fine’s description of fragmentalism.  The world according to the 
Fineian fragmentalist is one wherein: 
 
There are to be many alternative realities. But these are not alternative possibilities for 
reality, for no one of them is distinguished as actual. Nor are they alternative perspectives 
on reality, for there is no more fundamental reality upon which they are a perspective. 
And nor are they incomplete parts of a more comprehensive reality, since each of them, 
on its own, settles all of the facts…there is no underlying reality, of the usual sort, of 
which these different realities are a manifestation. (Fine, 2006, p. 403) 
 
The fragments that compose the Fineian fragmentalist’s world do not form the unified picture of 
reality with which we are familiar.  To remain as consistent as possible, when speaking of 
Fineian fragmentalism, I will refer to ‘the world’ as the totality of all of the fragments and 
‘reality’ as something that belongs to each of the individual fragments.  With this in mind, and 
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specifying the account further still, the following are the four core tenets of Fineian 
fragmentalism: 
 
(1) Tense Realism:  The world is, at least in part, constituted by tensed facts. 
(2) Neutrality:  The tensed facts in (1) are not oriented towards one time. 
(3) Incompatibility:  The neutral tensed facts in (2) are divided into incompatible fragments. 
(4) Coherence:  The incompatible fragments in (3) are maximally coherent sets of neutral 
tensed facts. 
 
(1) holds that there really are past, present, and future facts that are not reducible to the 
earlier than, simultaneous with, or later than relations.  These tensed facts are what ground or 
make tensed statements true.  For instance, if an observer O in Maryland happens to notice that it 
is currently raining and declares “it is raining in Maryland”, O’s utterance would be made true by 
a tensed fact about the world, namely it is the case that it is now raining in Maryland.   
As captured by (2), fragmentalism endorses a form of neutrality about time wherein no 
time is given a special status (see Savitt 2016).  The commitment to neutrality means that: 
 
No time is privileged. The tensed facts that constitute reality are not oriented towards one 
time as opposed to another.  (Fine, 2005, p. 271)  
 
Given (2), the tensed facts that partly constitute the fragmentalist’s world cannot be said to be 
aligned with one time rather than another.  This means that fragmentalism should not be viewed 
either as a variant of presentism wherein one fragment is deemed as a special moment that is the 
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present or a version of presentism wherein all of the tensed facts in each fragment align with the 
present of each fragment.  Rather, all of the fragments are of equal specialness and the tensed 
facts constituting the individual fragments may be of past, present, or future alignment.   
Connecting (1)-(4), it follows that the fragmentalist’s world is an amalgamation of 
neutrally orientated tensed facts, such as It is the case that Alex was reading “Life and Fate”, and 
atemporal facts, such as “humans call this object a chair”, that are sectioned into groupings that 
are internally consistent but irrevocably at odds with one another.   
In order to fully appreciate the philosophical import of Fineian fragmentalism it is 
important to note that it is meant to successfully respond to an objection to tensed A-theoretic 
accounts that can be traced back to McTaggart.  In his 1908 article “The Unreality of Time”, 
McTaggart famously argued that the tense realist – what he coined the endorser of the “A-series” 
–  has a potential contradiction on their hands.  The issue for the tense realist stems from an 
incompatibility that is brought out by the absolute determinations of past, present, and future.  To 
say that the determinations of past, present, and future are absolute is to say that they hold 
throughout the universe and are therefore not relativized to any given frame of reference.  
According to tense realism, then, all observers will agree about which facts belong to the present, 
the past, and the future.   
To see how the fragmentalist attempts to avoid the McTaggartian contradiction, we can 





8 The following analysis of Orwell’s 1984 is similar in kind to LePoidevin’s (2003) discussion of the contradictory 




➢ In the recent past it is the case that Orwell was writing 1984 in the present 
➢ In the present it is the case that Orwell wrote 1984 in the recent past 
➢ In the near future it is the case that Orwell wrote 1984 in the not-so-recent past 
 
There is no contradiction contained within the above list of present facts.  However, if both the 
past and the present exist, then the tense realist must also account for: 
 
Past Facts: 
• In the recent past it is the case that Orwell is going to write 1984 in the near future 
• In the present it is the case that Orwell is writing 1984 in the present 
• In the near future it is the case that Orwell wrote 1984 in the recent past 
 
As with the list of present facts, the list of past facts is internally consistent.  The problem arises 
when we try to countenance a reality wherein both the list of present facts and the list of past 
facts must obtain.  This is because in such a world the following would all have to be true: 
 
(A) 
• In the recent past it is the case that Orwell was writing 1984 in the present 
• In the recent past it is the case that Orwell is going to write 1984 in the near future 
 
(B) 
• In the present it is the case that Orwell wrote 1984 in the recent past 
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• In the present it is the case that Orwell is writing 1984 in the present 
 
(C) 
• In the near future it is the case that Orwell wrote 1984 in the not-so-recent past 
• In the near future it is the case that Orwell wrote 1984 in the recent past 
 
Granting that the law of non-contradiction holds, the statement-fact-pairs contained in (A), (B), 
and (C) cannot both be true.  For instance, assuming as the tense realist usually does that there is 
only one present that holds universe-wide, it cannot be a fact that in the present Orwell is both 
currently writing 1984 and that he wrote 1984 in the recent past.  This would amount to saying 
that it is a fact that Orwell has presently both completed and not completed 1984.  The situation 
for the tense realist only gets worse if the reality of the future, along with the accompanying 
future facts, is introduced.   
What is the tense realist to do at this point?  Fine’s answer is that the tense realist ought 
to embrace fragmentalism.  Unlike an A-theoretic view such as presentism, which seeks to avoid 
the existence of incompatible facts by positing that only the absolute present exists, Fineian 
fragmentalism embraces a world wherein inconsistency reigns.  As captured by (2), it is a basic 
postulate of fragmentalism that the world is divided into incompatible fragments.  Narrowing our 
focus down to three fragments for the moment, we might imagine – rather implausibly – that the 
tensed facts that compose a possible fragmented world are limited to the nine present tense facts 






Fragment 1 Fragment 2 Fragment 3 
 
It is presently the case that 




It is presently the case that 
Orwell is writing 1984  
 
It is presently the case that 
Orwell has completed 1984  
It is presently the case that 
Morgan is sitting  
 
It is presently the case that 
Morgan is standing 
It is presently the case that 
Morgan is jumping 
It is presently the case that 
the year is 1944 
It is presently the case that 
the year is 1947 
It is presently the case that 
the year is 1955 
 
 
Figure 2.  Three Fragments. 
 
The facts that respectively form the distinct fragments 1, 2, and 3 are all of equal metaphysical 
specialness, absolute, and irreconcilable.  It therefore follows from the overall account of the 
world presented in figure 2 that Morgan is presently sitting, standing, and jumping, for instance.   
At this point, one may understandably be confused by the fragmentalist resolution of the 
McTaggartian contradiction.  Is the fragmentalist, it might be wondered, truly resolving the 
worry with tense realism?  How might a plethora of incompatible fragments help the 
fragmentalist avoid the charge that the tense realist is committed to a contradictory set of 
absolute tensed facts?  Is not, in other words, offering an incoherent metaphysical account of the 
world a poor way to respond to the objection that your theory is incoherent?  The Fineian 
fragmentalist, however, has a solution to restore intelligibility to their ontologically disjointed 
world.   
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  According to the Fineian fragmentalist, if we consider the relationship between the 
ontology and semantics of time, we will see that consistency in fact reigns in the world of 
fragmentalism.  We can illustrate the fragmentalist’s reasoning with the help of Figure 2.  As a 
reminder, the fragmented world in Figure 2 considered sub species aeternitatis tells us that the 
tensed facts in fragments 1, 2, and 3 all exist equally and are contradictory.  Hence, according to 
the overall account of the world offered in figure 2, it is true – in an absolute sense – that the 
present year is 1944, 1947, and 1955.  This is the point at which the fragmentalist will appeal to 
semantics by noting that language use is situated within the individual fragments.  An utterance 
will only be true if it occurs within a fragment that includes the relevant facts and it will only be 
false if it occurs within a fragment that does not include the relevant facts.  From fragment 2, for 
example, the utterance ‘it is presently the case that the year is 1947’ is true, while the utterance 
‘it is presently the case that the year is 1955’ is false.  Given the situated use of language to 
within each fragment, and seeing as no fragment contains contradictory facts, there will never be 
a true utterance of a contradiction in the fragmented world depicted in figure 2.  From this, the 
Fineian fragmentalist can conclude that the ontological framework presented in figure 2 neither 
leads to nor supports the truth of contradictory utterances.   
Since any fragmented world will follow the general model presented by figure 2, the 
Fineian fragmentalist can respond to allegations that they endorse an incoherent theory by 
stressing that any given utterance is focused on a single, maximally coherent fragment and not 
the world en masse.  As long as this line of reasoning is convincing, there is a consistent way to 
speak about and understand the fragmentalist’s general picture of the existence of time.   
    Perhaps the most obvious downfall with thinking that appealing to the relationship 
between the ontology and the semantics of time truly solves worries brought out by the 
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McTaggartian contradiction is that the fragmentalist is left with an incoherent overall ontological 
basis to their semantics.  To put the objection another way, even if there is a way to make sense 
of and give meaning to it, the fundamental account of the ontology of time belonging to the 
world that is offered by the Fineian fragmentalist remains contradictory. 
In reply, the Fineian fragmentalist can acknowledge that there will always be a 
perspective from which their theory harbors contradictions.  Nonetheless, they can maintain that 
for all practical purposes, and as understood from the worldview of embedded observers, Fineian 
fragmentalism comes out as a consistent theory of time.  The important thing to stress is that it is 
the fragments that are explanatorily basic rather than the set of facts that obtain in the world as a 
totality (see Hofweber and Lange 2017).   Further, a reminder could be given that, while all of 
the absolute facts in a fragmented world obtain, no contradictory tensed facts co-obtain since the 
fragments themselves are to be considered distinct realities.  Along these lines, it may be more 
fruitful to think of Fineian fragmentalism as akin to a multiverse or many-worlds view wherein 
each fragment has its own consistent and comprehensible timeline.  Just as a multiverse, for 
instance, contains many functionally independent and non-interacting universes that may lead to 
inconsistent results when combined, Fineian fragmentalism houses a plethora of fragments that 
each tell an internally lucid story and yet when viewed in total lead to some highly questionable 
outcomes.  Another way to get at the same idea might be to think of fragmentalism in terms of 
Lewisian possible worlds.  Each individual fragment would be a possible fragment that is just as 
real as the fragment that we happen to inhabit.  When we say, from within our fragment, that 
only what is happening “now” is actual, what we would be doing is picking out our momentary 
fragment from the other possible – and equally real – momentary fragments.  There are, then, at 
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least a few things that may be said in response to the objection that the ontological basis of 
Fineian fragmentalism dooms the theory to the dustbin of unsatisfactory theories. 
My aim thus far has been to show how one might argue that sense can be made of Fineian 
fragmentalism by appealing to both its ontological and semantic basis.  Even if we are not 
licensed to reject it outright as an unintelligible theory, there are still many aspects of Fineian 
fragmentalism that are likely to elicit some perplexed head scratching.  We might, for example, 
wonder about the details of the coherence relation that relates tensed facts and thereby defines 
the connection between the fragments.   
 In his original discussion of fragmentalism, Fine (2005) suggests that we may want to 
take the coherence relation to be fundamental.  The reason for this is that, while the coherence 
between tensed facts explains why it is that some tensed facts are conjoined into coherent 
fragments and others are not, there does not seem to be anything that serves to explain the 
coherence relation itself.  Some might find the inexplicable character of the coherence relation to 
be too mysterious to endorse.  Yet, allowing that all metaphysical theories will include some 
amount of basic facts, the fundamentality of the coherence relation should not in itself be 
objectionable.  If one is willing to accept fundamental facts but is specifically adverse to the 
coherence relation being such a fact, then there may be some prospect in reducing the coherence 
between tensed facts down to the moment of time to which they belong.  This would in essence 
amount to explaining the conjunction of tensed facts that separates reality into fragments in terms 
of their coherence with one another and then explaining the coherence of tensed facts in terms of 
their identification with a given moment of time. 
 In light of what has been said, it might be thought that the prospects for Fineian 
fragmentalism are much better than one would think at first glance.  My goal in the next section 
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is to argue that, even if one thinks that the fragmentalist can provide a plausible account of time 
itself, the possibilities for a fragmentalist version of mind-independent temporal passage are 
uninspiring.    
 
3. Fragmented Temporal Passage. 
I start this section by suggesting that the Fineian fragmentalism is unable to accommodate the 
genuine passage of time.  If this line of argument is correct, there would be reason to think that 
fragmentalism, at least as it was first devised by Fine, it is not a successful A-theoretic, tensed 
theory.  Having set aside Fineian fragmentalist temporal passage, I turn to Lipman’s tenseless 
fragmentalist proposal for genuine temporal passage and argue that there is no reason to favor it 
over other well-known accounts of the passage of time.   
 
3.1. Fineian Fragmentalist Temporal Passage. 
There are two different general frameworks for the genuine passage of time in a fragmented 
world: 
 
Global Passage:  This is the type of temporal passage that governs the world in its 
totality.   
 
Local Passage:  This is the type of temporal passage that belongs to each fragment. 
 
Global passage is a singular universe-wide phenomenon that describes the passage of time as a 
process which encompasses and influences everything that exists in time.  Local passage is a 
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singular phenomenon from within any given temporal perspective and multitudinous when 
viewed from the world as a totality.  If it is the case that local passage is just global passage from 
a particular perspective, then local passage would be the same thing as global passage.   
 When it comes to the relationship between, on the one hand, genuine local and global 
passage and, on the other hand, our experience of time, it seems to me that: 
 
➢ Our experience provides indirect corroboration for genuine global passage. 
➢ Our experience provides direct corroboration for genuine local passage. 
 
Genuine global passage is indirectly supported by our experience insofar as we infer from our 
experience that the passage of time is a phenomenon that extends beyond us to the world at large.  
One reason to think that genuine local passage finds direct backing in our experience is that, no 
matter how hard we might try, it seems impossible to shake the feeling that the moments of our 
own lives are continuously slipping past us.  The seemingly inevitable passing of the moments of 
our lives does not appear to be a phenomenon that we are imposing on a world wherein time 
really does not pass.  Providing further support for genuine local passage, our experience tells us 
that as long as we live not only our own lives but those of others and the proximate world itself 
are also inescapably caught up in the workings of the passage of time.  As a result, both our 
internal experience and our perception of our immediate surroundings give direct vindication to 
the claim that the local passage of time is mind-independent.   





…on the current view, there is no obvious impediment to accounting for the passage of 
time in terms of a successive now. We have assembled all of the relevant NOWs, so to 
speak, even if there remains some question as to why the relationship between them 
should be taken to constitute a genuine form of succession.  (p. 288)  
 
Although Fine is not providing a comprehensive explanation of the relationship between 
fragmentalism and the genuine passage of time, he sees no reason why such an account could not 
be worked out.  His focus is on global passage because he conceives of the fragmentalist’s task 
to be a matter of elucidating the connection between the individual fragments.  Contra Fine, I 
will suggest that this is an insurmountable task. 
In order to see why it is that Fineian fragmentalism is ultimately unable to provide an 
acceptable account of genuine global passage, more needs to be said about the main features of 
our experience that recommend a global account.  A global account is recommended to us 
insofar as we deduce the following features of temporal passage from our direct experience of 
time: 
 
(a) The passage of time is a phenomenon that continuously ushers moments from the future 
to the past.  In this way, it provides a way to distinguish the present from the past and the 
future. 
(b) The passage of time is a phenomenon that cannot be put to a halt and its workings are 
irrevocable and influence all that exists in time. 




(a) captures both the feeling that the passage of time is the umpire of the past, the present, and 
the future and the feeling that without the passage of time it would make little sense to say that 
there is a difference between that which is present, that which is past, and that which is future.  
(b) supports the feeling that the passage of time is a phenomenon that cannot be stopped9 and 
that the influence it has cannot be changed or reversed.  That the passage of time cannot be 
stopped according to our common experience of it seems pretty clear.  While it may feel like 
some moments drag on forever and others speed by much too quickly, no one – I think –  would 
seriously propose that a defining feature of the workings of temporal passage is that it can be 
stopped and started on command, at will, or even randomly.  It also seems central to our 
experiential understanding of the passage of time that it cannot be flipped or altered.  We neither 
believe that we are able to wake up one morning to the experience of moments that have passed 
awaiting our future experience nor think that temporal passage can be shuffled or mixed up 
insofar as a random moment that has passed, for example, can suddenly make an appearance in 
the present in any form other than recollection.  (c) affixes to the feeling that temporal passage is 
the time-keeping device of the world, and it underlies our conventional use of the passage of 
time in accounting for the time that is given to us.   
In connecting (a)-(c) to the genuine global passage of time, we can begin by noting that a 
common theme underlying (a)-(c) is the assumption that the passage of time is a unified 
phenomenon that applies to the world at large.  Both the ushering of moments and the distinction 
between the past, the present, and the future in (a) presuppose an absolute past, present and 
future that hold throughout the world.  That there is an absolute past, present, and future is 
supported indirectly by our experience given that we use our direct experience of a single – albeit 
 
9 Here we might want to add the caveat that this holds for matter travelling at subluminal speeds. 
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changing – present that marks an absolute divide between the past and the future as a basis for a 
universal, absolute division between the past, present, and future.  The impact of the passage of 
time and the inability to stop the progress of temporal passage in (b) apply to everything that 
exists in the world.  That the passage of time does have such an encompassing reach is to be 
concluded indirectly from our experience since our direct experience informs us that all we come 
into contact with is subject to the ceaseless workings of the passage of time, and from this we 
infer that everything outside our direct experience must also be subject to the same workings.  
The time-keeping of existence in (c) refers to a universal system that connects and provides a 
way to measure all of the moments of existence.  Evidence that such a system exists follows 
indirectly from our experience given an extrapolation from our direct experience of the passage 
of time in accounting for the moments of the world around us to the totality of the moments of 
the world.        
The main tools fragmentalism offers to make sense of the concept of genuine global 
temporal passage are the core tenets (1)-(4).   (1) – tense realism – fits nicely with both (a)-(c) 
and global passage since it provides the distinction in tense that is required to mark a difference 
between the past, the present, and the future.  (2) – neutrality – could be said to be compatible 
with global passage as long as one fragment can be picked out as the present.  This fragment, 
then, would be the special fragment that moves, progresses, or somehow renews itself.  (4) – 
coherence – does not by itself stand in conflict with global passage.  It would, for instance, 
seemingly be in line with an account of genuine global passage wherein the world was divided 
into maximally coherent parts that connected with one another.  In such a world, we would be 
able to explain the global passage of time as the type of temporal passage that applies to and 
relates the parts of the world as a whole.  Perhaps such a view would even be comparable to the 
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moving spotlight theory.  The maximally coherent aspects of reality might be thought of as those 
parts that may be illuminated by the spotlight and the coherence between the parts as a matter of 
the association that exists between moments given that some moments are in the past of and 
some moments are in the future of the spotlight.  There are undoubtedly many more things to be 
said about such a view.  The important point is that it is (3) – incompatibility – that seems to be 
the main place where issues arises for genuine global passage in a Fineian fragmented world.   
The irreconcilability of the coherent fragments entailed by (3) – incompatibility – means 
that any account of genuine global passage in line with Fineian fragmentalism must encompass 
fundamentally unrelated moments.  The reason for this is that, since the fragments are to be 
thought of as their own realities that are contradictory with one another, a global account of 
temporal passage would have to subsume incompatible realities under its rule.  Appealing again 
to the idea of a multiverse or many-worlds view, global temporal passage in a fragmented world 
would be akin to global passage in a multiverse wherein all of the different, independent, and 
incompatible universes or worlds would have to be thought of as being governed by a single, 
unified phenomenon of temporal passage.  This would seem to be a very odd picture of global 
temporal passage.  To put the point yet another way, in a fragmented world there is no unified 
‘global’ basis of reality to which a global account of temporal passage can apply.  All that 
fragmentalism offers are disconnected, independent fragments that are each to be thought of as 
their own reality.  The passage of time between these incompatible and disconnected fragments 
can only be captured by an account of temporal passage that is itself in some way disunited and 
disconnected.  Such an account of temporal passage is an unfitting candidate for a global theory 
of mind-independent passage that governs the world as a totality and is consistent with our 
experience.  If (3) holds, it therefore does not make sense to speak of the passage of time, and 
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this seems to eliminate any acceptable prospects for a Fineian account of genuine global 
temporal passage. 
One way to further illustrate the worry for a fragmented account of genuine global 
passage is to compare it to genuine global passage according to other A-theoretic views, such as 
presentism or the moving spotlight theory.  Global temporal passage in a presentist world would 
serve to usher moments – along with their accompanying events and entities – from the non-
existent future into the existent present and then on into the non-existent past.  As a result, unlike 
fragmented global passage, global passage in a presentist world would govern moments of time 
that are notably connected.  Although the past and the future have a different ontological status 
than the present according to presentism, all three aspects of time belong to the same timeline.  
This means that there is no impediment to understanding the global passage of time as a unified 
phenomenon connecting the past, present, and future of the presentist timeline.  The applicability 
of a unified account of genuine global passage to the moving spotlight theory is perhaps even 
more straightforward.  The moving spotlight theory endorses both the eternalist continuum 
wherein the past, present, and future all exist – albeit unequally – on a single timeline and the A-
theoretic absolute distinction between the past, present, and future.  It is, then, easy to see how a 
unified account of global temporal passage would, in contrast to a fragmented world, work 
according to the moving spotlight theory.  This is because global temporal passage in a moving 
spotlight world would simply govern the entire timeline insofar as the absolute present moves 
along the eternalist continuum.        
It may be responded that a world composed of incompatible, disconnected fragments is 
not inevitably incompatible with genuine global temporal passage.  What, it could be asked, 
about the fact that, unlike a multiverse or many-worlds view, all of the fragments belong to one 
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world?  The motivation behind this question comes from the seemingly natural supposition that 
there is a single spatio-temporal structure underlying and acting as a container for all that exists 
in the spacetime of fragmentalism.  It is in line with the substantivalist claim that spacetime 
exists independently of material bodies and their spatiotemporal relations (see Dasgupta 2015 or 
Pooley 2012).  Applied to Fineian fragmentalism, the specific suggestion might be that the global 
passage of time applies to spacetime itself regardless of the nature of the fragments contained 
within spacetime.  There are two reasons why this response seems to be a category mistake.  
First, there is no substratal reality behind the fragmentalist’s fragments.  At least as they are 
conceived by Fine, the fragments are themselves fundamental insofar as there is no more 
fundamental reality of which they form a part.  Second, before asserting that it is even feasible to 
hold that time passes independently of that which exists in spacetime we would need to settle the 
matter of the passage of time in a temporal vacuum.  The general consensus has historically been 
that in a temporal vacuum time does not in fact pass (see LePoidevin 2003).  
 Given that (3) precludes genuine global temporal passage, and seeing as (a)-(c) are the 
features of our experience of time that recommend a global account, (3) should also rule out (a)-
(c).  In proposing that the passage of time is a phenomenon that transfers moments between the 
absolute future, present, and past, (a) requires that there is a single, universal, distinguishable, 
and unified past, present, and future through which moments pass.  If there is no global passage, 
there is no way for this requirement to be satisfied.  It seems important to note that global 
passage is not needed for there simply to be an absolute distinction between the past, present, and 
future.  A frozen version of presentism or even a non-moving spotlight theory would, 
irrespective of the plausibility of the theories themselves, include such a distinction.  Yet, if there 
is to be any ushering or movement of moments along with their corresponding entities and 
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events from the absolute future through the absolute past, there must be a mechanism that is able 
to explain and sustain the ushering or movement.  This mechanism is the global passage of time.  
Without global passage, the demands of (b) would also not be met.  (b) stands in need of a 
phenomenon that, via its perpetually active and irreversible influence, governs the temporal 
movement of all that exists in time.  Global passage is the right candidate for this phenomenon.  
Lastly, (c) is only satisfied if there exists something that acts as the mechanism behind the 
continuous progression of moments by regulating and offering a basis for our conventional ways 
of keeping track of time.  As with (a) and (b), global passage is the appropriate phenomenon for 
this role. 
 I have argued that (3) is the main reason why genuine global passage is untenable in a 
Fineian fragmented world and hence also why the Fineian fragmentalist is not able to 
substantiate the specific features of our experience of time (a)-(c) that recommend a global 
account.  The next question that needs to be addressed is: What options might the Fineian 
fragmentalist have for a local account of genuine temporal passage?  In response, we can begin 
by setting aside the option that the Fineian fragmentalist’s local passage is just global passage as 
experienced from within a given fragment.  If we are looking to produce a tenable account of 
local passage, it would be of little benefit to equate it with a view of temporal passage that turns 
out to be unsustainable in the end.  The Fineian fragmentalist’s local account of temporal passage 
must for this reason stay staunchly local.  The ramifications of this are that any and all temporal 
passage will be limited to and divided by the individual fragments.   
 It might be proposed that the requirement that the passage of time be limited to a local 
phenomenon is not a mark against Fineian fragmentalism.  It is, it could be suggested, more 
important to explain that which figures directly in our experience than that which figures 
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indirectly.  Not only do we have more evidence for that which factors prominently in our 
experience, we are more likely to be mistaken about that which we infer from direct experience 
than about our direct experience itself.  The claim, then, would be that providing a compelling 
account of genuine local passage should be, contrary to Fine’s remarks, the fragmentalist’s main 
goal. The idea being that, although it might be best if Fineian fragmentalism were able to offer 
an underpinning for both global and local genuine passage, if both cannot be done, it is better to 
provide the metaphysical grounds for local rather than global genuine passage.  While this does 
seem like a potentially promising line of argument, it is only as successful as Fineian 
fragmentalism’s account of genuine local temporal passage.   
One reason to think that Fineian fragmentalism does not deliver a very successful account 
of local temporal passage is connected to the momentary temporal extension of the fragments.  If 
the composition of each individual fragment is solely made up of momentary and simultaneous 
tensed facts, then from each fragment the only real tensed facts would presumably be those that 
belong to a single moment.  A single moment of time is presumably not in itself qualified to 
meet the requirements for a dynamic and active account of temporal passage.  When it comes to 
the passage of time the issue for the Fineian fragmentalist can thus be brought out by focusing on 
the unchanging character of the momentary, neutrally aligned tensed facts making up each 
fragment.   
To expand on the above reasoning, if all of the neutrally aligned tensed facts composing 
each fragment are unchanging, momentary groupings of simultaneous facts, then, insofar as 
change is necessarily connected to the passage of time, it seems that the prospects for a Fineian 
fragmentalist account of genuine local passage are not overly bright.  This is because an 
unchanging array of facts does not lend itself to the renewal, progress, or, say, movement that is 
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so central to A-theoretic temporal passage.  Although the neutrality of the fragments rules out 
explaining Fineian fragmentalism as a frozen version of presentism wherein each fragment is – at 
least in part – composed of a set of momentary and unchanging present tensed facts, it might 
help to think about the fragments in this light in order to get a clearer understanding of the 
problem.  It is arguably uncontroversial that unchanging incompatible present’s are not a good 
candidate for a dynamic, moving, progressing picture of local passage.  Momentary, 
simultaneous present tense facts themselves offer only a static “snapshot” of facts about the 
world at a given moment.  There is no metaphysical ground from which to find anything 
resembling dynamic, A-theoretic passage in such facts.  Along similar lines, the neutral, 
simultaneous, and momentary tensed facts constituting the individual fragments do not provide 
sound metaphysical grounds for a dynamic account of temporal passage.  Bringing everything 
together, the reason that Fineian fragmentalism is not able to proffer a convincing basis for 
genuine local temporal passage in line with our experience is that the unchanging list of present 
tense facts that describe the world in its totality at a moment and the non-tensed facts, such as 
“2+2=4”, that combine to constitute each individual fragment exhibit none of the defining 
characteristics of A-theoretic, dynamic temporal passage. 
At this juncture, it may be pointed out that not all theorists of time will agree that there is 
a necessary connection between change and the passage of time.  B-theorists and block universe 
tenseless theorists will argue that change can be separated from the passage of time since there 
can be mind-independent change without the mind-independent passage of time10.  The argument 
for mind-independent change without the mind-independent passage of time begins by defining 
change as the same entity having one set of properties at one time and a different set of 
 
10 See, for instance, Mellor (1981 and 1998) or Williams (1951). 
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properties at an earlier or a later time.  For instance, at time T1 a light is red and at a later time 
T2 the same light is green.  It then looks for an objective correlate of the earlier than relation that 
allows us to distinguish processes such as weight gain from weight loss (see Maudlin 2007).  
This asymmetry might be found in the direction of increasing entropy, for example.   
There are two things to say in response to the claim that mind-independent change and 
mind-independent temporal passage can come apart.  On the one hand, the Fineian fragmentalist 
should think, in opposition to the standard tenseless B-theorist, that there is a very close 
relationship between the passage of time and change insofar as they defend a tensed, A-theoretic 
view.  The reason that the standard B-theorist and block universe theorist deny that there is a 
necessary connection between passage and change is that they want to allow for mind-
independent and non-dynamic change in a world wherein time itself does not really pass.  
Sharing no such motivation, the Fineian fragmentalist should be on board with following the 
arguably common-sense supposition that where there is change, time can be said to pass and 
where time passes, there will be change11.  On the other hand, even if one were to argue that 
fragmentalism is a non-standard tensed, A-theoretic theory, the fragments themselves would not 
support the first step in the tenseless B-theoretic argument for mind-independent change without 
mind-independent temporal passage.  As a reminder, the first step defines mind-independent 
change in a non-dynamic way as the having of properties at one time that are not had at another 
time.  When combined with the ontological disconnection between the fragments, it seems that 
the momentary nature of each individual fragments is not able to provide the structure for non-
dynamic change since there are no other moments in relation to which an entity or event can be 
 
11 This would also be in agreement with the claim that time does not pass in a temporal vacuum. 
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said to have different properties.  Fragmentalism would therefore not be compatible with a local 
account of genuine temporal passage in line with the standard version of the tenseless B-theory.       
I have argued that there is reason to think that Fineian fragmentalism is incompatible with 
both the genuine global and local passage of time.  Given that these two options exhaust the 
possibilities for mind-independent temporal passage, it should follow that Fineian fragmentalism 
is not a suitable candidate for an account of time capable of supporting our experience.  Not 
everyone, though, agrees that fragmentalism is an unfit contender for a world wherein time really 
passes.  Lipman (2018), for instance, maintains that time really passes in a fragmented world.   In 
an effort to fully assess fragmentalism’s prospects for mind-independent temporal passage, I next 
address Lipman’s proposal.      
 
3.2. Lipman’s Tenseless Fragmentalist Temporal Passage. 
Lipman (Ibid) argues both that time really passes in a fragmented world and that this passage 
should be understood as the most basic temporal notion.  Before analyzing Lipman’s 
fragmentalist genuine basic temporal passage, it is important to point out that Lipman’s version 
of fragmentalism differs in certain respects from the Fineian fragmentalism that has been the 
basis for the discussion up to this point.  Lipman’s version of fragmentalism endorses the view 
that: 
 
…the world shouldn’t be read as featuring tensed descriptions of facts. Contra Fineian 
fragmentalism, the fragmentalist framework that will be the basis for the passage theory 
of time doesn’t feature tense at all, not even the present tense. The descriptions should all 
be understood as tenseless descriptions. The reason for this is simple. If the claim that 
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‘Aristotle is alive’ were understood as saying that Aristotle is now alive, then, in treating 
all times on a par, the fragmentalist would be claiming that it is now the case that 
Aristotle is alive. But it’s a straightforward historical fact that Aristotle isn’t now alive.  
In entertaining the fragmentalist view, I’m simply not concerned with the way things are 
now. The fragmentalist’s predications must be tenseless predications if we are to adopt a 
truly neutral standpoint and treat the contents of all times on a par. We can think of 
‘Aristotle is alive’ as expressing that Aristotle instantiates a certain property, not as 
expressing that he instantiates the property now, nor that he always or eternally 
instantiates the property, just that he has the property.  (Ibid, p. 107) 
 
While a Fineian account would hold that a statement such as “Aristotle is alive’ should be 
understood as Aristotle is now alive, Lipman maintains that ‘Aristotle is alive’ should be 
understood to express that there is a certain property that Aristotle instantiates.  It is, further, 
neither the case that Aristotle instantiates the property of being alive now nor that he instantiates 
the property eternally.  Nothing about where in time a given object has a given property is 
implied by the predication of properties according to Lipman’s account. 
 The contrast between Fine and Lipman is by no means a minor discrepancy.  As noted, 
Fine (2005) introduced fragmentalism as the best metaphysical theory of realism about time.  His 
suggestion being that, if one is going to be a tensed theorist, then one ought to be a fragmentalist.  
Turning fragmentalism into a tenseless theory therefore flips its original purpose on its head.  If 
the relationship between Lipman’s fragmentalism and the passage of time is to be made clear, 
more needs to be said about his analysis of the passage of time. 
26 
 
 While there are many moving parts to Lipman’s theory of time based in passage, there 
are a few key features that stand out.  Since the passage of time is the most basic notion, it is the 
precondition for phenomena such as ‘change’ and ‘movement’.  In itself, passage consists in a 
fact’s ceasing to obtain, coming to obtain, or recurrent obtaining.  Seeing as Lipman’s analysis is 
concerned with the relation between facts that exist at different moments, it follows that his 
analysis of the passage of time is global in scope.  Every true passage sentence will either have a 
sentence on one side and its negation on the other or the same sentence on both sides.  For 
instance, the fact that Morgan is jumping might pass into the fact that Morgan is not jumping and 
the fact that Morgan is standing might pass into the fact that Morgan is standing, but the fact that 
Morgan is jumping will not pass into the fact that it is raining in Maryland.  This stipulation on 
temporal passage is meant to capture the idea that passage involves either one state being 
produced from or coming out of another.  Letting ↪ stand for ‘passes into’, Lipman’s theory 
holds that the following may all be cases of temporal passage (Ibid, p. 110/111): 
 
➢ Coming to be:  A comes to be iff  ¬A ↪ A 
➢ Ceasing to be: A ceases to be iff A ↪ ¬A 
➢ Coming to be a particular way: A comes to be a particular way B iff ¬AB ↪ AB 
➢ Ceasing to be a particular: A ceases to be a particular way B iff AB ↪ ¬AB 
➢ Staying the same: A stays the same iff A ↪ A 
 
Because the passage of time is the most basic phenomenon, there would be no explanatory basis 
for the above cases of temporal passage.  Why, though, might fragmentalism be the apt 
framework for such passage?   
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As it is conceived by Lipman, there are two principal aspects of fragmentalism that make 
it the right theory from which to make sense of the passage of time.  First, it endorses the view 
that all times are ontologically on a par.  Second, it holds that contrary facts equally obtain.  
These two features of fragmentalism are crucial given that when it comes to the passage of time:  
   
There are the facts that are constitutive of each moment of time and there is the passing 
of the one collection of facts into the other.  (…)  Only the passage of a fact into a 
contrary fact can make for a genuine change of the objects involved in those facts. So if 
the facts of distinct times equally obtain, and those facts make for genuine change across 
time, then it seems that contrary facts equally obtain. (Ibid, p. 95) 
 
Lipman’s reasoning here is that the passage of time leads us to fragmentalism and fragmentalism 
supports the passage of time insofar as the passage of time involves a relation of contrary 
existent facts across time and fragmentalism maintains that all times exist and contrary facts 
equally obtain.   
 An example might help to explicitly connect Lipman’s version of fragmentalism to his 
account of temporal passage.  Let’s take Morgan’s standing passing into Morgan’s not standing 
as our example.  It would follow from Lipman’s fragmentalist genuine basic passage that both 
the fact that Morgan is standing and the fact that Morgan is not standing should be understood as 
tenseless facts that convey no information about where in time Morgan is standing and where in 
time Morgan is not standing.  The fact that Morgan’s standing passes into Morgan’s not standing 
is a basic fact that requires that both the fact that Morgan is standing and the fact that Morgan is 
not standing equally exist.  Letting A stand for ‘Morgan’ and B stand for ‘is standing’, Lipman’s 
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account would understand the passing of Morgan’s standing to Morgan’s not standing as: AB ↪  
¬AB. 
 One final thing to point out about Lipman’s view is that it is distinct from both the typical 
A-theoretic and B-theoretic notions of temporal passage.  It is in opposition to the A-theoretic 
conception of passage because it denies that tensed descriptions of the world are more 
fundamental than tenseless description.  Lipman believes this divergence from the A-theory to be 
a point in favor of his view because he thinks that the A-theory is unable to provide a feasible 
account of genuine temporal passage.  In short, his main issue with the standard A-theoretic 
notion of temporal passage is that, seeing as A-theoretic tensed sentences are only ever 
descriptions of the current state of the world, the closest they come to capturing the passage of 
time is in a perpetual re-writing of their description of the world.  This re-writing, so the claim is, 
does not capture the passage of time.  This is because the passing of time is in the waiting 
between the switching from one tensed description of the world to another and is thus not found 
in any of the descriptions that are offered by an A-theoretic theory (Ibid, p. 96).  In contrast to 
standard B-theoretic notions of temporal passage, Lipman argues that the passage of time is 
mind-independent.  The reason that he proposes for why the traditional tenseless descriptions of 
the world offered by the B-theorist are inadequate for genuine passage is that they are only 
relations that hold between compatible facts (Ibid, p. 97).  If the passage of time is to allow for 
change, then it must be able to make room for cross-temporal incompatible relations between 
facts.  Lipman defends this reasoning by claiming that change itself involves the passing of facts 
into contrary facts12.  
 
12 Lipman’s stipulations on change here go against the sparse account of change, as previously introduced, that is 
traditionally defended by the B-theorist.  
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 The first thing to observe in reply to Lipman is that his fragmentalist basic temporal 
passage does not allay the argument that Fineian fragmentalism is a deficient tensed theory since 
it is unable to follow its A-theoretic rivals in supplying a genuine account of the dynamic 
passage of time in line with our experience.  Hence, even if Lipman is correct about the nature of 
genuine temporal passage and its metaphysical framework, his theory would not help the 
traditional tensed fragmentalist avoid the main charge forwarded in this paper.  There is, 
however, reason to doubt that Lipman does indeed present a winning examination of the 
workings of and setting for the passage of time.   
 The main stumbling block for Lipman’s account is that it is unclear why the non-
fragmentalist A-theorist and the B-theorist are not, despite what Lipman suggests, able to 
produce either essentially the same or better accounts of temporal passage.  The non-
fragmentalist A-theorist may argue that an A-theoretic view can invoke a basic notion of 
temporal passage relevantly akin to Lipman’s.  This move on behalf of the A-theorist might go 
as follows: 
 
(i) Lipman holds that the standard A-theory does not capture an animated picture of 
temporal passage since all that it can offer is a continual re-writing of descriptions of 
still snapshots of the world. 
(ii) Given (i), Lipman proposes that the standard A-theoretic notion of temporal passage 
is insufficient and would be better replaced by a basic notion of temporal passage set 
in a  tenseless fragmentalist framework, which captures facts ceasing to obtain, 
coming to obtain, or recurrent obtaining via states being produced from or coming out 
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of each other.  For instance, tenseless fact A comes to be iff  ¬A ↪ A, wherein ↪ 
captures the passing of ¬A into A. 
(iii) In response to (ii), the A-theorist can argue that they can also employ a basic notion 
of temporal passage that “animates” their tensed A-theoretic framework by capturing 
facts ceasing to obtain, coming to obtain, or recurrent obtaining via states being 
produced or coming out of each other.  For instance, tensed fact C comes to be iff  ¬C 
↪ C, wherein ↪ captures the passing of ¬C into C. 
 
At the surface level, there seems to be very little difference in the work that the passage of time 
is doing between (ii) and (iii).   
In reply, it could be pointed out that the facts in (ii) are tenseless whereas the facts in (iii) 
are tensed.  Yet, given that ¬A is incompatible with A and that  ¬C is incompatible with C, both 
the fragmentalist in (ii) and the A-theorist in (iii) would meet Lipman’s stipulation that, for time 
to pass, contrary facts must obtain.  It may be further objected that the tenseless facts in (ii) and 
the tensed facts in (iii) do not equally exist.  The tenseless facts in Lipman’s fragmentalist 
framework all have the same ontological status while the tensed facts in the non-fragmentalist A-
theoretic framework are not ontologically on par.  Why, though, must the incompatible facts 
exist equally in order for time to pass in the basic sense that Lipman proposes?  If, as Lipman 
argues, the passage of facts into contrary facts makes for genuine change and if the passage of 
time is the precondition for genuine change, then it should follow that the passing of any 
contrary facts signifies genuine change and is underwritten by the passage of time.   
Following a different course, the B-theorist might agree with Lipman’s assessment of the 
A-theory, but push back on his dismissal of the B-theoretic possibilities for temporal passage.  
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The least conciliatory response would be for the B-theorist to double down on the assertion that 
the passage of time is mind-dependent and that genuine change does not require genuine 
temporal passage.  Toward this end, the B-theorist may praise the tenselesness of Lipman’s 
fragmentalism and yet question his commitment to the active nature of temporal passage, which 
is usually associated with the A-theory.  The specific argument might be that it is not easy to see 
how Lipman’s basic notion of passage captures the dynamic processes of coming to be and 
ceasing to be between incompatible tenseless facts that is, according to Lipman himself, central 
to genuine temporal passage and change.  Where in the actual space-time world is basic passage 
to be found and would it not be better if we could say more about the basis for temporal passage?  
Simply positing that the genuine passage of time is a brute fact about the world to be found in the 
passing of facts into either the same or incompatible facts is not, so the argument might continue, 
overly illuminating.  Taking this line of response would be to object to the inscrutable character 
of Lipman’s basic temporal passage.  The traditional B-theorist is likely to go on to add that a 
more promising recourse for solving the puzzling phenomenon of passage is to be found in the 
project of deciphering the psychological basis of our erroneous experience that time really 
passes.   
One thing to keep in mind is that there exist a very small minority of B-theorists who will 
concur with Lipman that the passage of time should be considered a mind-independent and basic 
fact about our world.  For instance, Maudlin (2007), who is a proponent of the block universe 
ontology often associated with the B-theory and mind-dependent temporal passage, goes against 




….an intrinsic asymmetry in the temporal structure of the world, an asymmetry that has 
no spatial counterpart.  It is the asymmetry that grounds the distinction between 
sequences which run from past to future and sequences that run from future to past.  (p. 
108) 
 
The genuine passage of time is also: 
 
…an asymmetry that plays a role in explaining both the nature of the final state of the 
universe and the constant increase in entropy that connects the initial to the final state.  
(p. 135) 
 
While both Lipman and Maudlin conceive of the genuine passage of time as a basic fact about 
the world that has no underlying explanation, Maudlin applies his account to the standard 
tenseless block universe associated with the B-theory, whereas Lipman works from a non-
standard tenseless fragmentalist he associates with neither the A-theory nor the B-theory.  As 
mentioned, the main reason why Lipman thinks fragmentalism provides the best home for a 
basic notion of temporal passage is that fragmentalism allows for the equal existence of 
incompatible facts.  An adherent of basic temporal passage in the block universe, though, can 
point out that incompatible facts, while necessary for genuine change according to Lipman, are 
not necessary for the genuine passage of time.  Seeing as time genuinely passes even if facts stay 
the same for Lipman, the B-theoretic defender of basic temporal passage in the block universe 
could argue that time may still be said to genuinely pass in a world where there are only 
compatible facts.  With this allowance in hand, the next task would be to extend basic genuine 
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temporal passage to compatible yet different facts.  This would permit such passage to be 
expanded to include all of the facts in a B-theoretic block universe.  While a full defense of this 
move would require an adequate investigation that is beyond the scope of the present discussion, 
the takeaway is that there may be important points of agreement between some B-theorists and 
Lipman that renders the two camps not as disanalogous as they may appear at first sight. 
 
4. Conclusion.                    
Fine’s (2005 and 2006) addition of fragmentalism to the discourse between tensed and tenseless 
theories of time remains a welcome and refreshing development.  I have suggested that it should 
ultimately be concluded that Fineian fragmentalism is a subpar tensed, A-theoretic account 
owing to its inability to deliver an acceptable setting for genuine temporal passage.  Lipman 
(2018) has offered an account of global passage in a fragmented world that is based in a tenseless 
and basic notion of temporal passage.  My response to Lipman was twofold.  First, I argued that 
Lipman’s tenseless fragmentalism does not help the traditional fragmentalist, who embraces a 
tensed account, furnish a convincing footing for either the genuine global or local passage of 
time.  Second, I proposed that both the non-fragmentalist A-theorist and the B-theorist could 
plausibly make a case that the standard A-theoretic and B-theoretic notions of temporal passage 













The claim that the passage of time is in some sense dependent on the mind finds strong support 
from many within both the philosophic and scientific communities (see Price 2011 or Williams 
1951).  Stressing the consonance between their views and theories such as relativity (see 
Silberstein et al. 2018), B-theorists and block universe theorists have traditionally argued that the 
idea that time really passes is at best metaphysically mysterious and at worst metaphysically 
incoherent (see Mellor 1981)13.  In contrast to B-theorists and block universe theorists, A-
theorists and dynamic theorists usually hold that time genuinely passes and we have the 
metaphysical machinery to both coherently and convincingly elucidate such passage (see Prior 
1970).  The debate over the fundamental nature of the passage of time has thus far proved to be 
intractable, admitting of neither universal agreement nor straightforward solutions. 
 My aim is to consider one unique solution to the puzzle of passage.  Norton (2010) 
argues that, although a precise description of its workings is currently beyond our understanding, 
time really passes.  Norton’s view is particularly interesting insofar as it strikes a middle ground 
between, on the one hand, B-theorists and block universe theorists who propose that the passage 
of time is an illusion and little sense can be made of the objective, mind-independent passage of 
time and, on the other hand, A-theorists and dynamic theorists who defend the position that time 
really passes and we can offer a meaningful account of time’s passage. 
 
13For exceptions to this see Maudlin (2007) or Mozersky (2015), for instance. 
35 
 
Both the middle ground it stands upon and its seeming adherence with our everyday 
experience of passage are arguably advantages of Norton’s account.  Despite these potential 
pros, I think that more work needs to be done in order to successfully refute those who argue that 
time does not really pass.  Toward this end, I begin by introducing Norton’s account and 
suggesting that it both implies a counterintuitive relationship between the “now” and passage and 
that it leads to an unlikely relationship between our experience and reality.  I then argue that, 
even if one is willing to accept these consequences, there is reason to question whether Norton 
builds a convincing case for the claim that, since we are not able to find any of the identifying 
characteristics of an illusion in the case of temporal passage, the passage of time is not an 
illusion.   
 
2. The Relationship between the “Now” and Passage. 
It really feels as if time passes.  We seemingly find ourselves part of a world wherein, 
independent of our inclinations and at times against our wishes, day follows day and no moment 
sticks around for more than a moment.   The most compelling motivation to think that time really 
passes comes from our experience of the ceaseless progression of both our own lives and the 
world around us. 
Going against our experience, our best physical theories support the idea that the passage 
of time is an illusion.  Merging space and time into a four-dimensional manifold of spacetime, 
relativity theory, for instance, reduces motion to the spacetime geometry of Minkowski 
spacetime.  Ruled out by special relativity’s relativity of simultaneity, in this spacetime geometry 
there is no basis for an ontologically special “now” that holds universe wide and somehow 
“changes” with the passing of successive moments of time.  According to special relativity, then, 
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the “now” is not absolute but rather relative to an observer’s frame of reference.  There is 
therefore arguably no foundation for anything like dynamic, objective, and mind-independent 
temporal passage in relativity.  If it is the case that time really does not pass, our main task would 
be to uncover the cognitive basis and mechanism responsible for our experience of temporal 
passage. 
Noting that the passage of time is not to be found in our physics, Norton nevertheless 
dismisses the idea that temporal passage is illusory.  His primary motive for rejecting the picture 
of passage provided by our physical theories stems from what he proposes to be our best 
evidence.  This evidence is experiential in nature and consists of the way that the world presents 
itself to our consciousness via a succession of interconnected moments.  As explained by Norton 
(2010): 
 
Time really passes. It is not something we imagine. It really happens; or,(…), our best 
evidence is that it does. Our sense of passage is our largely passive experience of a fact 
about the way time truly is, objectively. The fact of passage obtains independently of us. 
Time would continue to pass for the smoldering ruins were we and all sentient beings in 
the universe suddenly to be snuffed out. (p. 24) 
 
Unlike the passage of time, which is a prominent feature of our experience, Norton believes that 
our experience does not provide evidence for a spatially extended “now”.  Instead, what is given 




The passage of time is one of our most powerful experiences. What is not in that 
experience is the idea of a present moment, the "now," that has any significant extension 
in space. The "now" we experience is purely local in space. It is limited to that tiny part 
of the world that is immediately sensed by us. (Ibid) 
   
When it comes to the “now” and its relation to the passage of time, I want to suggest that there is 
an issue for Norton’s view insofar as it is committed to both the following about the passage of 
time: 
 
(i) One of our most powerful experiences is of the passage of time. 
(ii) Our experience of the passage of time is of an objective fact about time, which 
tells us about the way time truly is. 
(iii) Given (i) and (ii), time really passes and the positive evidence we have for this 
comes from our experience. 
 
and the following about the “now”:  
 
(a) Our experience supports a “now” that is purely local in space. 
(b) Our physics of space and time point towards a “now” that is purely local in space. 





Why might one be hesitant to commit to both (i)-(iii) and (a)-(c)?  In order to answer this 
question, we can begin by observing that the “now” is inextricably bound with the passage of 
time.  This is because it is essential to the passage of time that there be more than one moment of 
time and that what is “now” be different from one moment to the next.  This difference may be 
cashed out in various ways depending on which metaphysical theory of passage one endorses.  
For example, if one is a moving spotlight theorist the passage of time will be captured by the 
movement of the present (i.e. “now”) – which is highlighted by the spotlight – along the 
eternalist continuum, while the presentist will describe the passage of time via the changing or 
renewal of the present.  Unless one is willing to endorse the view that time passes in a temporal 
vacuum, time will not pass lest what is “now” alters in some way over or with time.  It follows 
from this that, if we grant both (i)-(iii) and (a)-(b), the passage of time would be local insofar as 
all our evidence supports a purely local “now”.  This is a supposition that Norton accepts. 
 On initially being told that the passage of time is a local phenomenon we may wonder 
about the limits of this localness.  To determine how local the local passage of time is, we would 
need to figure out the boundaries of “now”.   As mentioned, Norton believes that the boundaries 
of “now” extend only so far as the very limited part of the world that is immediately sensed by 
us.  Importantly, this would mean that what is “now” may be different for people not sharing the 
same immediate environment.  It would also mean that the objective passage of time is limited to 
the part of the world that is immediately sensed by us.  Although there may be some debate over 
what is “immediately sensed by us”, it seems clear that what is immediately sensed by us will be 
of quite limited extension.  There are two reasons why it seems odd to limit the objective, mind-




(1) It posits an unusual connection between our ability to sense something and its reality. 
(2) It entails that it is nonsensical to talk of the passage of time. 
 
 Starting with (1), Norton’s view offers us two ways to think about the relationship 
between reality and our senses.  The first way of understanding this relationship is one that 
Norton himself would arguably dismiss quickly.  The second way seems to suffer from a lack of 
internal motivation.   
First, it might be argued that limiting the scope of the objective, mind-independent 
passage of time to our local experience is an unusual way to think of the relation between reality 
and our senses because it makes reality dependent on our experience.  If reality were dependent 
on our experience, we would be able to change the reality of temporal passage by altering our 
experience.  Moreover, it would leave the door open for the possibility that objective passage is 
itself fractured insofar as it is dependent on individual minds.  This line of thinking gives the 
mind a power over reality that most of us would be hesitant to grant.  It also directly contradicts 
Norton’s main thesis that time would continue to pass without humans and goes against the idea 
of objective passage.  It would therefore be an unhappy consequence of Norton’s view that he is 
likely to reject. 
Second, it might be suggested that we should flip the reasoning around and suppose that, 
rather than us having the ability to influence the objective passage of time, the reality of temporal 
passage is what informs our sense of passage.  Doing so, however, it would be unclear why, as 
Norton maintains, we should accept that the objective passage of time is localized to the part of 
the world that is immediately sensed by us.  Why, we might challenge, should an objective, 
mind-independent phenomenon be delimited by that which figures prominently in our 
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experience?  What would happen if all conscious agents were to disappear?  How would we then 
understand the limits of the ‘now’ and thus the passage of time?  While Norton might respond 
that what he means by ‘immediately sensed by us’ is actually ‘relative to a frame of reference’, 
he does not explicitly say this, and it also seems that what is immediately sensed by us is much 
narrower than that which is relative to a given frame of reference.   
 Moving on to (2), the idea is that if we limit the objective passage of time to a local 
phenomenon that is evinced by our experience, we rule out the possibility of temporal passage 
being a unitary feature of our world.  If the passage of time is objective, mind-independent and 
non-unitary, then it would be the case that either the world has one temporal dimension with 
varying localized regions of potentially disparate passage or that the world itself has more than 
one temporal dimension.  Neither option accords very well with our experience and pre-
theoretical thoughts about temporal passage.  Both the idea that there are numerous incompatible 
regions of temporal passage throughout the universe and the idea that the world itself has 
multiple temporal dimensions go against the following features of the passage of time, which 
seem to me to be recommended by our experiential, pre-theoretic understanding of time: 
 
(I) The passage of time is a phenomenon that continuously ushers moments from the future 
to the past.  In this way, it provides a way to distinguish the present from the past and the 
future. 
(II) The passage of time is a phenomenon that cannot be put to a halt and its workings are 
irrevocable and influence all that exists in time. 




 The first feature captures both the feeling that the passage of time is the umpire of the 
past, the present, and the future and the feeling that without the passage of time it would make 
little sense to say that there is a difference between that which is present, that which is past, and 
that which is future.  The second feature supports the feeling that the passage of time is a 
phenomenon that cannot be stopped14 and that the influence it has cannot be changed or reversed.  
That the passage of time cannot be stopped according to our common experience of it seems 
clear.  While it may feel like some moments drag on forever and others speed by much too 
quickly, I do not think that anyone would seriously propose that a defining feature of the 
workings of temporal passage is that it can be stopped and started on command, at will, or even 
randomly.  It also seems central to our experiential understanding of the passage of time that it 
cannot be flipped or altered.  We neither believe that we are able to wake up one morning to the 
experience of moments that have passed awaiting our future experience nor think that temporal 
passage can be shuffled or mixed up insofar as a random moment, for example, that has passed 
can suddenly make an appearance in the present in any form other than recollection.  The third 
feature affixes to the feeling that temporal passage is the time-keeping device of the world, and it 
underlies our conventional use of the passage of time in accounting for the time that is given to 
us.   
 All three features go against the world having one temporal dimension with varying 
localized regions of potentially disparate passage or the world itself having more than one 
temporal dimension.  This is because a common theme that underlies (I)-(III) is the assumption 
that the passage of time is a unified phenomenon that applies to the world at large.  Both the 
ushering of moments and the distinction between the past, the present, and the future in (I) 
 
14 Here we might want to add the caveat that this holds for matter travelling at subluminal speeds. 
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presuppose an absolute past, present and future that hold throughout the universe.  The impact of 
the passage of time and the inability to stop the progress of temporal passage in (II) apply to 
everything that exists in the world.  The timekeeping of existence in (III) refers to a universal 
system that connects and measures all the moments of existence.  (I)-(III), then, seem to require a 
unified and global account rather than a local account of temporal passage. 
 There are two things to flag at this point.  First, if the local passage of time simply 
amounts to the global passage of time as viewed from a certain perspective rather than a distinct 
multitudinous phenomenon, then the local passage of time would be in agreement with our 
everyday thinking.  This move seems to be ruled out by Norton’s account seeing as he thinks that 
there is no basis for a spatially extended “now” that is global in extent.  Second, I have said that 
these features belong to our pre-theoretic, everyday experience of the passage of time, and one 
might wonder in exactly what sense this is so.  Although there is much more that could be said 
on the topic, I want to suggest that (I)-(III), which support a global rather than local account of 
temporal passage, are an inferred part of our experience that informs our pre-theoretic 
understanding.  For instance, we infer from our experience of not being able to stop the passage 
of time in our immediate environment that the passage of time cannot be stopped on the other 
side of the world, or on the moon, or in Andromeda and beyond.  My claim is not that we are 
correct in our reasoning.  Rather, it is that (I)-(III), which factor into our experience and pervade 
our pre-theoretic understanding of temporal passage, go against a local account of genuine 
temporal passage.  
 Seeing as Norton is basing his account on a tight connection between our everyday 
experiential understanding and the reality of temporal passage, the incompatibility between (I)-
(III) and the local passage of time would be an unfavorable result.  While we may be persuaded 
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to accept that the passage of time is objective, mind-independent and non-unitary based on 
compelling scientific or metaphysical considerations, on quick reflection our experience 
arguably supports the idea that there is only one temporal dimension wherein we and the world 
around us are subject to the ceaseless progression of a unified phenomenon.  In sum, the second 
reason to doubt that the passage of time is localized to our immediate environment is that it goes 
against our sense that temporal passage is an unbounded and unitary phenomenon. 
 Along with the appeal to our experience, Norton defends the claim that time really passes 
by arguing that the passage of time lacks the defining characteristics by which we distinguish 
other illusions. 
 
3. On Illusions. 
We know that, on the one hand, our experience tells us that time really passes and, on the other 
hand, our best physical theories strongly suggest that the passage of time is an illusion.  One way 
to argue for the former and against the latter would be to show that the passage of time is unlike 
any other illusion with which we are familiar.  We might, for instance, take as our example the 
familiar illusion of a straight stick that appears bent when it is half emerged in water.  Norton 
proposes that there are two means by which we persuade ourselves that a phenomenon is in fact 
an illusion (Ibid, p. 29): 
 
(1) We are able to control or eliminate it. 




Working with the example of the stick in water, we see that (1) applies since we can both 
eliminate and control the illusion by removing the stick from the water.  (2) is also satisfied 
insofar as we know that the mechanism behind the apparent bending of the stick is the refraction 
of light. 
 Norton maintains that neither (1) nor (2) pertain to the passage of time.  (1) is not 
applicable since for all appearances we are not able to eradicate the passage of time from our 
experience.  Although psychologists have been able to perform experiments to induce temporal 
dislocations, these dislocations have been on a very short timescale of milliseconds (see 
Rocchesso & Lemaitre 2013).  Such miniscule dislocations, the reasoning goes, are far from 
what we would anticipate if the passage of time were itself an illusion.  Seeing as we have not 
been able to identify the mechanism that might lie behind and hold responsibility for our 
experience of temporal passage, (2) is also not met.  There are a few ways that we can respond to 
the claim that we are not able to eradicate, control, or find the mechanism behind the passage of 
time. 
Starting with (1), we might first argue that our inability to eradicate the passage of time 
from our experience should not be surprising.  Our experience of the passage of time is itself a 
necessary condition for our having any experience.  This is because, in order to have an 
experience, there must not only be a change in our mental state but a first-person feeling that 
something that was once not part of the present moment is now part of the present moment.  
While such a feeling need not be an explicit part of our conscious experience, it does seem to be 
underwritten by the passage of time in that it requires a dynamic connection between what was 
once future, is now present, and will be past.  When it comes to the relationship between change 
and the passage of time, most B-theorists and block universe theorists will balk at the idea that 
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objective change requires the objective passage of time.  They will, however, likely agree that if 
we are to experience change, then we must experience time as passing.  A-theorists and dynamic 
theorists, conversely, will presumably be on board from the outset with the idea that there is a 
necessary connection between both objective and experiential temporal passage and change.   
All of this is to say that, unlike other familiar illusions, we are not able to eradicate our 
experience of the passage of time because in doing so we would be eradicating our capacity to 
have an experience itself.  This should lead us to conclude that, if the passage of time is an 
illusion, it is more fundamental to our existence than any of the other illusions of which we are 
aware and we should therefore not expect it to factor into our experience in the same way as 
other less fundamental illusions.  What about our ability to control the passage of time? 
 The minor temporal dislocations in our experience that have been produced in 
experimental settings are not enough to convince Norton that the passage of time is, similar to 
the bending of a stick in water, something that we can control.  Specifically, he thinks that if the 
entirety of temporal passage were an illusion, we should be able to generate much larger 
dislocations, perhaps along the lines of a day or a year: 
 
…there is a healthy tradition in experimental psychology that seeks to generate temporal 
dislocations in our experience. Subjects hear sounds in each ear that are delivered slightly 
dislocated in time. Yet they misperceive them as simultaneous. Subjects are lead to 
misperceive the exact timing of an event they see by hearing cleverly timed audible 
clicks.  These sorts of experiments are quite successful in leading to dislocations of the 
order of milliseconds. That sort of dislocation is remote from what one would expect if 
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the entirety of passage is an illusion. With all the tricks at their disposal, why can't an 
inventive researcher induce dislocations of the order of a day or a year? (Ibid, p. 29) 
 
  In response, we can ask the following: 
 
(a) Why must the dislocation be on such a large time scale? 
(b) Why think that dislocations larger than milliseconds are not possible? 
 
(a) asks why the capability to bring about any temporal dislocations in our experience should not 
count as evidence of our ability to control our experience of the passage of time.  To put it 
another way, if we are simply looking for evidence that the passage of time is a phenomenon that 
can be controlled, then why would we not take our power to manipulate our experience of it to 
any degree as evidence that it can in fact be controlled?  If this line of reasoning is convincing, 
(1) would apply to the passage of time.   
The idea behind (b) is that, although experimental psychologists as of yet have not been 
able to bring about dislocations greater than a few milliseconds, we should not rule out the 
possibility that such dislocations are attainable.  Norton takes our current inability to induce large 
dislocations as evidence that the passage of time is an objective, mind-independent fact about the 
world.  We might, though, just as readily take it as evidence for either our limited understanding 
of the science of temporal dislocation or the de facto limits of our cognitive system.  The latter 
would be the case if, for example, evolution has imposed a safeguard against our experiencing 
time either grossly out of order or drastically different than the norm for our species.  This option 
would not rule out the possibility that the passage of time is itself nevertheless an illusion.  Given 
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the above, it seems that we cannot dismiss the applicability of (1) to the passage of time.  This 
leaves us with (2). 
(2) concerns the mechanism responsible for an illusion.  This mechanism must be found 
in the way that our cognitive system tricks us into thinking that a feature of the world is real 
when in fact it is not.  As noted by Norton, we have not been able to pinpoint such a mechanism 
in the case of temporal passage.  Our failure to locate the exact mechanism, however, does not 
mean that (2) cannot be fulfilled in the case of the passage of time.  (2) does not state that we 
must be able to locate its mechanism in order for something to meet the criteria of an illusion.  
The passage of time might be one of those unusual circumstances where we have not, at least not 
yet, been able to specify a mechanism.  Further, assuming for the moment that the passage of 
time is an illusion, it is not as if we would be left completely in the dark as to the nature of the 
mechanism behind our experience of temporal passage.  At the most general level, we could start 
by classifying the passage of time with other familiar illusions involving a distortion in our 
perception of time.  Instances of such familiar temporal illusions include the telescoping effect – 
the temporal displacement of an event whereby people perceive recent events as being more 
remote than they are and distant events as being more recent than they are (see Morwitz 1997) – 
and the oddball effect – a perceptual phenomenon whereby novel or unexpected stimuli result in 
longer perceived time durations (see Schindel et al. 2011).  We could then, perhaps, narrow our 
analysis down to focus on how models of consciousness treat the process of the temporal 
ordering of subjective events in the brain15.  From there, we could look for the areas of the brain 
that are responsible for our experience of duration and continuation.  With an idea of how the 
brain both temporally organizes and connects together events, we would have a basis from which 
 
15Dennett and Kinsbourne (2011) offer such an analysis. 
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to postulate how it is that the mind imposes a dynamic quality on the temporal dimension of a 
world wherein time does not truly pass.   
Bringing everything together, there are circumstances under which both (1) and (2) are 
passably met in the case of the passage of time.  This means that, as with other familiar illusions, 
the passage of time can be said to possess the key characteristics by which we define an illusion.   
 
4. Conclusion. 
 Norton maintains that time really passes.  My goal has been to argue that the ontological status 
of the passage of time remains an open puzzle.  This argument has been supported in two ways.  
First, I have tried to show that Norton’s account has implausible consequences.  Second, I have 
suggested that Norton does not successfully dispose of the possibility that the passage of time 
shares in identifying features with other familiar illusions.  Moving forward, a potentially 
promising line of response from the proponent of objective, mind-independent passage might be 
to further defend the idea that temporal passage cannot be identified by the same means by which 



















My aim in this paper is to provide a defense of the B-theoretic, block universe theory of time 
over A-theoretic, dynamic accounts of time.  Towards this end, I begin by arguing that, although 
arguments from experience may at first glance appear to be on the side of A-theoretic, dynamic 
accounts, there is reason to think that experience does not provide decisive evidence in support 
of such views.  I then suggest that arguments from science and arguments from metaphysics 
provide strong incentive to be a B-theoretic, block universe theorist.  As a result, while a B-
theoretic, block universe view has two out of the three arguments on its side, A-theoretic, 
dynamic accounts are not decidedly supported by any of the main categories of arguments that 
may be forwarded in support of a theory of time.  I end by considering some of the unresolved 
questions posed to the B-theoretic, block universe theorist by arguments from experience.      
 
2. The B-theoretic, Block Universe. 
In this section, I introduce and explain three general categories of arguments that are commonly 
appealed to in support of a theory of time.  These arguments invoke various experiential, 
scientific, and metaphysical factors, many of which touch on areas of research that are currently 
live and active topics of inquiry.  Unless otherwise stated, all the considerations that follow come 
directly from the existing literature on time and are therefore not my own novel contributions.  
The outcome of the discussion will be that a survey of the existing arguments should lead us to 
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be B-theoretic, block universe theorists rather than A-theoretic, dynamic theorists.  First, though, 
a brief note about terminology.  
 
2.1. Brief Note about Terminology. 
I have been associating the B-theory with the block universe and the A-theory with dynamic 
views.  While this correlation holds throughout the literature, it is important to keep in mind that 
the B-theory is conceptually distinct from the block universe and the A-theory is conceptually 
distinct from any dynamic account of time.    
 One way to motivate the conceptual difference between, on the one hand, the A-theory 
and the B-theory and, on the other hand, the block universe and dynamic accounts is to focus on 
the scope of each view.  Toward this end, I will understand the block universe and dynamic 
accounts as theories about the ontological status of time, wherein: 
 
 The Block Universe:  Four-dimensional space-time block containing all that exists in 
 space and time.  While certain times may be epistemically privileged in the block, 
 all times are ontological on par.  Given that there is no time that can be picked out 
 as the present and since there is no active progression of the present itself, the passage of 
 time in the block is widely taken not to be a mind-independent phenomenon. 
 
 Dynamic Theories:  May hold that only the present exists, that the past and the present 
 exist, or that the past, the present, and the future all exist.  The present is always both an 
 epistemically and ontologically privileged time.  Depending on which times are thought 
 to unequally exist, the mind-independent passage of time will be captured by the 
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 continuous renewal of the present, the expansion of the present into the future, or the 
 movement of the present from the past to the future.   
 
The A-theory and the B-theory will be understood as theories about both the ontology and 
semantics of time that are distinguished in the following ways: 
 
 The A-Theory:  Holds that tensed language is fundamentally irreducible and usually 
 incorporates a dynamic ontology. 
  
 The B-Theory:  Holds that tensed language is reducible to a tenseless meta-language and 
 usually incorporates the block universe ontology. 
 
The A-theory and the B-theory, then, have a broader scope than dynamic views and the block 
universe.  While it is typically the case that a dynamic account is linked with the A-theory and 
the block universe is linked with the B-theory, not all theorists agree that the theories should be 
thus connected.  For example, Silberstein et al. (2018), suggest that the block universe and the B-
theory should remain separate theories.  Despite their conceptual independence, however, I think 
that there is convincing motivation to pair the A-theory with dynamic accounts and the B-theory 
with the block universe.  In order to bring out this motivation, a good place to start is by thinking 
about the nature of A-theoretic versus B-theoretic change.   
 Although the A-theory and the B-theory were initially introduced as a way to respond to 
McTaggart’s (1908) argument for the unreality of time, both theories preserve key features of 
McTaggart’s A-series and B-series respectively.  Following the A-series, the A-theory is lauded 
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by its defenders as the theory capable of furnishing genuine change.  Proponents of the B-theory 
will argue that the B-theory, inheriting its lineage from the B-series, is also able to supply an 
account of change.  Change, according to the B-theorist, is a matter of an entity or event E 
having properties at one time that are different than the properties had by E at an earlier or later 
time.  A-theorists will maintain that B-theory change is only a shadow of the genuine change 
captured by the A-theory.  The A-theorist’s reasoning here will be that genuine change 
inexorably involves the losing and gaining of properties and is therefore tied up with the notions 
of becoming, progression, and movement.  Since these notions only find a home in a theory 
wherein time itself genuinely and actively passes and seeing as the B-theory in its standard 
formulation denies that time really passes, genuine change, so the argument will proceed, is only 
captured by an A-theoretic account of time.     
 Given that the A-theory seeks to provide a compelling analysis of genuine change and 
insofar as genuine change involves some sort of movement, progression, or becoming, the A-
theorist is going to need a dynamic ontology of time.  Even an A-theoretic view such as the 
moving spotlight theory that, similar to the block universe, incorporates the existence of all times 
will impart a special status and movement to the present as a way to explain the mind-
independent passage of time.  Further, seeing as dynamic theories rely on there being a special 
present moment whose renewal, movement, or growth signifies the genuine passage of time, the 
dynamic theorist is also going to want to be an A-theorist.   
 In contrast to the A-theory, the tenseless character of the B-theory means that the B-
theorist explicitly rejects a fundamental distinction between the past, the present, and the future 
and dismisses any notion of a privileged present.  As a result, the B-theory accords well with the 
ontological equality of times afforded by the block universe.  The block universe theorist, in turn, 
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will be disposed to be a B-theorist so long as they feel the need to include the earlier than 
relation in the block universe.  This is because, in order to sustain notions such as change and the 
direction of time in the block universe, the earlier than relation will be needed.  The earlier than 
relation will be required if there is to be a direction of time as long as it is plausible to assume 
that the direction of time is an asymmetry of processes in time that runs from earlier to later 
processes.  The earlier than relation is crucial to B-theoretic change since it would arguably make 
little sense to say that there was a change, for instance, from A to B if there was no way to 
determine whether in fact A comes before B or B comes before A. 
 Given the above considerations, I will continue to couple the A-theory with dynamic 
accounts and the B-theory with the block universe.  The important questions, then, will be those 
surrounding which set of theories we ought to embrace and why this might be the case.  These 
are the questions that I address next. 
 
2.2. Experiential, Scientific, and Metaphysical Considerations. 
The three types of arguments in support of a theory of time that will be discussed in this section 
are: 
 
➢ Arguments from Experience:  Advance considerations related to the phenomenology and 
psychology of time, such as the fact that we remember the past but not the future. 
➢ Arguments from Science:  Advance considerations related to both microphysical and 
macrophysical aspects of time, such as the time reversal invariance of almost all physical 
processes in time. 
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➢ Arguments from Metaphysics:  Advance considerations related to the existence and 
fundamental nature of time, such as the temporal basis for persistence. 
 
Although the three categories of arguments focus on different specific features of time, there will 
be overlap between many of the general features of time of interest to each type of argument.  
Arguments from science and arguments from metaphysics, for instance, will both seek to address 
the basic structure of the temporal dimension of our world and its relationship to the three spatial 
dimensions.  All three categories of arguments will also presumably have something to say about 
the really big questions connected to time, such as the workings of the passage and direction of 
time.  Taking each of the three categories of arguments in turn, my goal will be to explain why 
the overall weight of the arguments recommends a B-theoretic, block universe rather than an A-
theoretic, dynamic account.          
 
2.2.1. Arguments from Experience.  
When arguments from experience are employed in the service of a semantic and ontological 
view of time it means that the view is thought to accord well with our experiential, pre-theoretic 
understanding of time – the way that it feels to be a being in time before we have subjected our 
experience to any rigorous thought or theoretical analysis.  Three central components of our 
experiential, pre-theoretic understanding of time are: 
 
(1) The Present: It feels as if the present – what is ‘now’ – is both more real and special than 
other moments of time.  It also seems to us that the present marks a clear divide between 
the past and the future. 
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(2) Passage: It feels as if time really passes in the sense that, no matter how hard we try, we 
can neither stop our progression through time nor bring a halt to time itself.  We are, as it 
were, irrevocably caught up in the flow, go, movement, and progression of time. 
(3) Direction: It feels as if there is a directedness to time insofar as we remember the past but 
not the future, know more about the present and the past than the future, and are not able 
to turn around in time and start living our lives towards the past instead of towards the 
future. 
 
Seeing as we are not able to directly see, hear, taste, touch, or smell time itself, our natural way 
of uncovering what time is must involve a more abstract and indirect application of our senses.  
It is through this means that we are led to conclude that (1)-(3) are key characteristics of time.  
(1) is a feature of time indirectly corroborated by our senses insofar as all of our conscious 
experience takes place in the present moment and we find the difference between our conscious 
lives and our memory and anticipation to be a stark one that clearly divides the present from the 
past and the future.  (2) shows up indirectly to our senses as a vital facet of time since everything 
that we see, hear, taste, touch, and smell only presents itself to our senses for a limited period of 
time and then passes out of our detection.  (3) is an attribute of time affirmed indirectly by our 
senses seeing as our apprehension of all processes, including our own lives, informs us that every 
process follows an invisible and irreversible course that is headed for the future. 
 A reason why one might think that (1)-(3) are crucial features of time that should be 
represented by any adequate theory of time is that it is not clear that we would be able to 
articulate any human experience that is not in some significant sense governed by (1)-(3).  What 
would it be like if our lives played out in the past?  Would the past, then, not simply become to 
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us what is considered the present?  How would we even begin to make sense of an experience 
that was frozen in time?  What about an experience wherein all processes in time, including the 
absorption of light by photoreceptor cells in the eye, was temporally reversed?  If our experience 
counts for anything, a major point in support of a theory of time is that it can be made to align 
with (1)-(3).  The argument by the A-theoretic, dynamic theorist, which is one that we all might 
be inclined to agree with upon initial reflection, is that A-theoretic, dynamic theories do a much 
better job of aligning with and accounting for (1)-(3) than the B-theoretic, block universe.  The 
exact details of this argument will vary in accordance with the details of each A-theoretic, 
dynamic theory.  Since there is not enough space to go over every possible A-theoretic, dynamic 
theory, my focus will be on presentism. 
 Presentism is an A-theoretical, dynamic view that may be briefly described as: 
 
 Presentism:  The view that only the present exists, while the past and the future are non-
 existent.  Time passes insofar as the present continuously renews itself and in doing so 
 ushers moments, along with their accompanying events and things, from the future to the 
 past.  
 
As a reminder, because presentism is an A-theoretic view, all talk of the notions of ‘the past’, 
‘the present’, and ‘the future’ employed by the presentist should be taken to represent a real and 
fundamental distinction between the past, the present, and the future that holds universe-wide.  
At first sight, presentism arguably seems like a good semantic and ontological basis for (1)-(3).  
Accounting for (1), the commitment to the existence of the present and the non-existence of the 
past and the future means that presentism fits very well with the feeling we have that the present 
57 
 
is a divide between the past and the future that is more real and special than the past and the 
future.  When it comes to (2), the presentist’s claim that the present is ever renewing itself – and 
in this way changing – aligns well with the feeling that time really passes insofar as time is 
always on the move and all processes in time are caught up in this progression, themselves ever 
moving with time.  Lastly, presentism provides plausible grounds for (3) in that the continuous 
renewal of the present via the non-existent future turning into the existent present and going once 
more out of existence as it passes into the non-existent past corresponds well with the feeling we 
have that there is a directedness to time that constrains all processes that unfold in time. 
 Unlike presentism, the B-theoretic, block universe may initially seem to be a poor match 
with (1)-(3).  The denial that tensed language expresses the ontological truth about the world 
combined with the ontological equality of all times may be argued to mean that (1) finds no 
footing in a B-theoretic, block world.  This is because a world wherein, on the one hand, our 
language use of the notions of ‘the past’, ‘the present’, and ‘the future’ do not connect to 
anything real in the world and where, on the other hand, every time exists and is equally real is 
not at first appearance a world that can ground our feeling that the present is an ontologically 
special time that marks a distinction between the past and the future.  Further, the lack of any 
active progression or genuine movement in a B-theoretic, block world may be thought to rule out 
the sense that we are caught up in the flow of time that is central to (2).  Finally, although the B-
theoretic, block universe theorist’s allegiance to the fundamentality of the earlier than relation 
furnishes an asymmetry between times that seems indispensable to our experience of living in a 
world where all processes follow a direction in time, some work would need to be done in order 
to show that the earlier than relation is enough to substantiate a global direction of time.            
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 In response to the claim that arguments from experience are resolutely on the side of A-
theoretic, dynamic accounts such as presentism, we can ask whether it really is the case that our 
experience of time would be different if we lived in a B-theoretic, block universe versus an A-
theoretic, dynamic universe.  If our experience was to be found identical whether we were in an 
A-theoretic, dynamic universe or a B-theoretic, block universe, then our experience could not be 
cited as a reason to favour one universe over the other.  Interchangeability of our experience 
between an A-theoretic, dynamic universe and a B-theoretic, block universe would therefore 
make all arguments from experience for one theory over the other essentially powerless.  
 ‘The epistemological argument’ is one argument that seeks to show that arguments from 
experience are unable to supply decisive motivation for either an A-theoretic, dynamic universe 
or a B-theoretic, block universe (see Prosser 2007, Silberstein et al. 2018, or Williams 1951).  
According to this argument: 
 
The Epistemological Argument:  Regardless of whether we live in an A-theoretic, 
dynamic universe or a B-theoretic, block universe our experience would be the same.  
This is because events can be mapped one-to-one (including mental events) from 
dynamic universes to the block universe. 
 
The basic idea behind the Epistemological Argument is that there would be no way for us to 
know whether we are in an A-theoretic, dynamic universe or a B-theoretic, block universe so 
long as our experience is equivalent between the two types of universes.  If the argument is to 
have any force, then there must be a satisfactory way to justify the claim that our experience 
would in fact be the same regardless of the temporal character of the universe in which we live.  
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Demonstrating that we could experience (1), (2), and (3) as key features of time in both an A-
theoretic, dynamic universe and a B-theoretic, block universe would be a way to achieve this 
feat.  The strong connection between an A-theoretic, dynamic universe and (1), (2), and (3) has 
already been outlined.  Ostensible reason has been given to think that a B-theoretic, block 
universe would not provide a congenial semantic or ontological setting for (1), (2), and (3).  The 
B-theoretic block universe theorist might nonetheless maintain that if we think about it more we 
will find that there is a way to make sense of the experience of (1), (2), and (3) in a B-theoretic, 
block universe.       
 (1) – the feeling that the present is somehow a special time that divides the past and the 
future – could be said to fit with a B-theoretic, block universe given that our immediate 
consciousness is of limited temporal extension.  The horizon of that which presents itself directly 
to our conscious experience, and in doing so forms our ‘now’, is sometimes called the ‘specious 
present’.  If all perceptions of the world that are “online” are contained within a brief temporally 
extended window that we deem the ‘now’, then it should not be surprising that this window feels 
special to us and acts as a divider between all that is directly available to our conscious 
experience and all that it not directly available to our conscious experience.  This would explain 
why we feel that there is an important distinction between everything in time that belongs to the 
‘now’, which we label ‘the present’ and everything in time that does not belong to the ‘now’, 
which we label ‘the past’ and ‘the future’.    
 (2) – the feeling that time relentlessly flows – could be accounted for in a B-theoretic, 
block universe by there being a psychological link between a stretched-out series of four-
dimensional presently-feeling experiences (see Callender, 2012).  The general idea behind this 
suggestion is that we can ground our dynamic experience of time in a B-theoretic, block universe 
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in the psychological connection between the different “static” moments of our lives.  While 
uncovering the specific details of this link is an ongoing area of psychological research, one can 
at least point towards the combination of “static” temporal slices and our psychology when 
explaining the feeling that time really passes in a B-theoretic, block universe.   
 (3) – the feeling that time has a direction – can be matched in a few ways with a B-
theoretic, block universe.  First, it could be argued that the ordering of moments of time by the 
earlier than relation is a basic fact about time that applies to the universe in its totality and 
therefore supplies an overall direction to the temporal dimension of our world.  Second, it might 
be suggested that there is an objective grounding for both the earlier than relation and an overall 
direction of time in a B-theoretic, block universe in the form of the causal arrow or the 
thermodynamic arrow, for instance.  Third, one could maintain that, although it is a mind-
independent fact that moments, along with their accompanying entities and events, are locally 
ordered by the earlier than relation, there is no objective basis for the direction of time as a single 
phenomenon that governs the entire universe.  Following this last option, any grounding for the 
sense that there is a singular, unified direction to the temporal dimension of our world would, 
similar to the standard account of the passage of time in a B-theoretic, block universe, have to be 
explained by an appeal to our psychology rather than a mind-independent fact about the world.   
 Given the Epistemological Argument, arguments from experience would be compatible 
with either A-theoretic, dynamic accounts or the B-theoretic, block universe.  Nevertheless, we 
may have a lingering feeling that there is a significant difference between the way that A-
theoretic, dynamic accounts relate to our experience and the way that the B-theoretic, block 
universe relates to our experience.  In particular, is it not the case that A-theoretic, dynamic 
accounts do a better job of providing a direct semantic and ontological explanation of why it is 
61 
 
that we experience (1)-(3)?  Said another way, even if arguments from experience are 
reconcilable with either view, should we not at least acknowledge and give credit to A-theoretic, 
dynamic accounts since they ground why it is that we experience the ‘now’ as special, feel that 
time genuinely passes, and pre-theoretically believe that there is a directedness to things in time 
provided by the direction of time, in the fundamental nature of the reality of time itself?   
 One thing to note in reply to the suggestion that A-theoretic, dynamic accounts are to be 
preferred simply in virtue of their being able to provide a direct semantic and ontological basis 
for key features of our pre-theoretic experience of time is that it arguably seems to flip the 
correct direction of explanatory dependence between our experience and the world.  The reason 
for this is that it uses our experience of time to determine the correct semantic and ontological 
reality of time as opposed to starting from the most credible semantic and ontological basis of 
time and using this to explain our experience of time.  If we feel the pull of heeding our best 
scientific and metaphysical considerations, then we ought to start from the science and 
metaphysics of our world rather than our experience.  Of course, if our experience is in line with 
our science and metaphysics, then there are no worries.  This, however, does not seem to be the 
situation when it comes to the passage of time.    
 If the A-theoretic, dynamic theorist responds that their theory is in fact motivated by the 
best scientific and metaphysical account of time, then the task would be to clearly demonstrate 
why this is the case.  Directly dampening the prospects of this endeavour, the remainder of this 
section highlights arguments from both the domains of science and metaphysics that support the 
B-theoretic, block universe.  Given both the Epistemological Argument and reason to make our 
scientific and metaphysical picture of time the explanans of our experience of time, these 
arguments should provide a persuasive defense of the B-theoretic, block universe. 
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2.2.2. Arguments from Science. 
The primary scientific theory cited in the literature in support of a B-theoretic, block universe is 
Special Relativity (SR) (see Minkowski 1908, Smart 1964, or Crisp 2007).  The argument is that 
SR’s relativity of simultaneity strongly suggests the ontology of time incorporated by the B-
theoretic, block universe.  Accompanying this argument is the claim that the B-theoretic, block 
universe is recommended by Minkowski space-time, which is the picture of space-time offered 
by the geometrical picture of SR.  In particular, the B-theoretic, block universe commitment to a 
tenseless account of time combined with the equal existence of all times accords well with the 
lack of a privileged present and the “static”, unmoving picture of time presented by Minkowski 
space-time.  Some theorists have proposed that the ontology of the B-theoretic, block universe is 
supported by the combination of General Relativity (GR) and SR even more than SR alone, 
while GR itself is less hospitable to A-theoretic, dynamic views such as presentism than SR 
alone (see Silberstein et al. 2018).  The general idea motivating this thinking is that many 
solutions to GR do not provide a global foliation, and there is nothing in Einstein’s equations that 
guarantees that there will be a global foliation or preferred frame.  As a result, the existence of a 
global foliation or preferred frame that is so central for an A-theoretic, dynamic account ends up 
being contingent on the initial conditions, which are themselves contingent. 
 There is disagreement in the literature about whether the argument from relativity 
presents conclusive evidence in support of the general picture of time offered by the B-theoretic, 
block universe.  However, although not every theorist is ready to cede pride of place in relativity 
to the B-theoretic, block universe tradition (see Hinchliff 2000 or Skow 2009), there is a general 
consensus that relativity does indeed necessitate, or at least strongly suggest, this tradition (see 
Bouton 2017).  To keep the argument as uncontroversial as possible, my discussion will be 
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limited to the support from science that is given to the B-theoretic, block universe from SR.  I 
will not devote much space to the discussion since this support is well-trodden territory within 
the literature.   
 The principal point that I want to highlight is that one of our most successful and 
experimentally verifiable scientific theories of time seems to be telling us that the fundamental 
nature of time is not A-theoretic and dynamic in character.  Unless some third option were to be 
devised, and seeing as a B-theoretic, block universe appears to be well-suited to SR, our 
conclusion should be that arguments from science, at least those motivated by SR, recommend a 
B-theoretic, block universe.  One caveat to mention is that there are obviously other theories of 
the physical world aside from SR.  The appropriate response here seems to be that the role of 
time in other fundamental theories of physics, such as Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Field 
Theory, is less established than it is in Relativity Theory.  It is, then, not altogether misguided to 
use Relativity Theory as our representative scientific theory. 
 The main reason that Relativity Theory is thought to be at odds with A-theoretic, 
dynamic accounts is that, according to the relativity of simultaneity, there is no basis in SR for an 
absolute, universe-wide divide between the past, the present, and the future.  To see why the 
relativity of simultaneity is usually cited against A-theoretic, dynamic accounts and for the B-
theoretic, block universe, we start can by considering figure 116. 
 
 





Figure 1.  Relativity of Planes of Simultaneity. 
 
According to the moving observer A at A0: 
 
➢ B1 is now 
➢ B1 is in the future for B at B0 
 
According to the moving observer B at B0: 
 
➢ A1 is now 
➢ A1 is in the future for A at A0 
 
It does not follow that since A at A0 experiences B1 as the now and B at B0 experiences A1, 
which is in the future for A at A0, as the now that A1 is now for A at A0 nor does it follow that 
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since B at B0 experiences A1 as the now and A at A0 experiences B1, which is in the future for 
B at B0, as the now that B1 is now for B at B0.  The light postulate of SR is the primary reason 
that these things do not follow.  The light postulate puts a speed limit c on the speed of light in 
all inertial frames of reference in empty space.  Taking into account the relativity postulate of 
SR, which states that in all inertial reference frames the laws of physics are the same, and seeing 
as A and B are spacelike separated, in order for either B at B0 to influence A at A1 or for A at 
A0 to influence B at B1, the signal would have to travel faster than the speed of light.  As long as 
the light postulate holds, there will be no fact of the matter as to whether B1 or A1 is now or in 
the future.  The relationship between A and B in figure 1 therefore demonstrates the main claim 
of the relativity of simultaneity: distant simultaneity depends on an observer’s frame of reference 
rather than being absolute.   
 Seeing as A-theoretic, dynamic accounts employ a notion of absolute simultaneity, they 
directly conflict with SR’s relativity of simultaneity.  In contrast, the lack of any absolute times 
and absolute distinctions between the past, the present, and the future entailed by a B-theoretic, 
block universe allows for the relativization of simultaneity central to the relativity of 
simultaneity.  According to both SR and a B-theoretic, block universe, ‘now’ is nothing more 
than an indexical that points to a temporal frame of reference, along the same lines as ‘here’ is an 
indexical that picks out a locational frame in space.   
 When the reasoning behind the relativity of simultaneity is applied to every temporal 
perspective in the universe, the result is that all times must be said to equally exist according to 
SR.  This is because every possible observer experiences the moment they occupy as existing 
and each observer has an equal claim to what moment in fact exists.  As represented by 
Minkowski space-time, this means that time in SR is to be considered another dimension, akin to 
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the three spatial dimensions.  Just as Spain and Andromeda exist even though we are located in 
Paris, the year 1535 and the year 2100 exist17 even though we are located in 2020.  The 
dimensionality of time corresponds with the B-theoretic, block universe ontological equality of 
all times.  It is, though, at odds with the A-theoretic, dynamic views of presentism and the 
growing block theory, which respectively hold that only the present exists and that only the past 
and the present exist.  While the dimensionality of time is in a sense at one with the existence of 
the past, the present, and the future that is key to an A-theoretic, dynamic view such as the 
moving spotlight theory, it is at variance with the moving spotlight theorist’s allegiance to both 
the specialness of the present and the absolute division between the past, the present, and the 
future.  It is for reasons such as these that the B-theoretic, block universe is thought to provide a 
better match for SR than A-theoretic, dynamic accounts.     
 
2.2.3. Arguments from Metaphysics. 
As with arguments from science, my suggestion will be that, on the whole, the relevant 
arguments from metaphysics back the B-theoretic, block universe.  To defend this, I will outline 
three metaphysical pros of a B-theoretic, block universe over worlds governed by an A-theoretic, 
dynamic conception of time.  The first two pros are familiar territory within the literature.  The 
third is a consideration that seems to be important but finds less attention within the literature.   
 First, a B-theoretic, block universe does not have to face the potentially insurmountable 
challenges inherent in explaining why and how it is that an ontologically special present moves, 
renews, or grows.  Providing a coherent and non-mysterious analysis of the workings of the 
movement, renewal, or growth of the present is a very difficult task since all attempts to do so 
 
17 That is, of course, as long as the timeline of the world in fact extends this far. 
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seemingly ground out in metaphor (see Williams 1951).  For example, in an attempt to explain 
the movement of the present from the past to the future, the moving spotlight theorist may 
propose that the present is to be thought of as an illuminated moment of time that, similar to a 
beam moving over a row of house fronts, “lights” up the timeline as it travels (see Broad 1923).  
This description of the movement of the present may help to conceptualize the moving spotlight 
theory, but it leaves many questions answered.  What, we might wonder, in the actual world 
corresponds with the illuminated present?  Why does the present move?  Is there force acting on 
the present?  What happens to entities and events in the past and the future when they are not 
present?  One metaphysical advantage of the B-theoretic, block universe is that it does not have 
to deal with the extra explanatory burden imposed by the dynamic nature of A-theoretic, 
dynamic accounts. 
 A second pro of the B-theoretic, block universe is that it can ground past and future truths 
in the existence of the past and the future.  A contingent truth such as Aristotle existed uttered in 
2019, for instance, would be made true by something in the world – namely, the existence of 
Aristotle – that is a part of reality over two thousand years later than the point on the world’s 
timeline where Aristotle can be found.  An A-theoretic, dynamic view such as presentism would 
not be able to ground the truth of Aristotle existed in the existence of the past.  The inability of 
presentism to ground truths about the past and the future in the past and the future themselves 
has been termed the “grounding objection” against presentism (see Asay & Baron 2014 or 
Mozersky 2011).   
 Two things to keep in mind about the grounding objection are that, for one, it might not 
be as convincing when applied to the future and, in addition, it is not clearly an objection to all 
A-theoretic, dynamic accounts.  If one is comfortable with there being no truths about the future, 
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the grounding objection can be restricted to past.  While presentism seems to be the obvious 
target of the grounding objection, there may be a sense in which it can be advanced against other 
A-theoretic, dynamic views.  The future version of the grounding objection straightforwardly 
applies to the growing block view insofar as it posits that the future does not exist.  Seeing as the 
future version of the grounding objection is on less secure footing than the past version, this may 
not be a great worry to the growing block theorist.  Although I am not aware of any detailed 
discussion of this point, it seems that both the growing block view and the moving spotlight 
theory are susceptible to a variation of the past version of the grounding objection since they are 
committed to the diminished reality of the past in comparison to the reality of the present.  It 
might be argued that diminished existence is enough to ground past truths.  It is, though, not 
clear whether diminished reality would necessarily lead to diminished truth and, if so, what it 
means for something to be a diminished truth.  Hence, both the growing block theorist and the 
moving spotlight theorist would need to tackle a few questions before successfully showing that 
their theories can fully evade the grounding objection.  The B-theoretic, block universe theorist is 
not laden with such a task since they endorse the equality of all times. 
 A third point that recommends the metaphysics of the B-theoretic, block universe is 
connected to the persistence of objects over time.  There are two main theories of persistence 
over time: perdurantism and endurantism.  An object is said to perdure if only a temporal part of 
it exists at any given moment of time.  An object is said to endure if throughout its existence it 
exists as a whole from one moment of time to another moment of time.  The block universe 
theory is typically thought to support perdurantism, while endurantism is usually partnered with 
an A-theoretic, dynamic view (see Hawley 2001, Lewis 1986 and 2002, Quine 1950)18.  What I 
 
18 This, however, is not always the case.  Mozersky (2015) offers a version of the B-theory that supports 
endurantism, for example. 
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want to propose is that there is prima facie motivation to think that perdurantism is more 
successful than endurantism at capturing the way that objects present themselves in the world.     
 Only a part of an object O, strictly speaking, exists at any given moment according to 
perdurantism, but the temporal slices of O all nevertheless add together to carve out a unique 
place in space-time for O.  As a result, O in its temporal totality is an amalgamation of all of the 
time slices of O.  This means that the intrinsic properties of O need not be captured by any 
individual time slice of O.  Perdurantism therefore provides a way to understand both the 
essential connectedness and the intrinsic variation of the properties of objects over time that is 
central to our understanding of worldly existence.  Said another way, perdurantism does a good 
job of capturing the feeling we have that an object, such as a person, is more than they are at any 
given moment of time and that there is something that connects the different parts of an 
individual life across time into a coherent whole. 
Endurantism is arguably well-equipped to deal with the unity of objects over time but 
struggles with the variation of objects over time.  Because an object O endures by being wholly 
present at each moment it exists, as long as O has an extended temporal duration, there will be a 
connection between O at different times.  This is because O is the selfsame object at any time it 
exists.  The selfsame nature of O at different times, though, arguably precludes the intrinsic 
variation of O’s properties over time given that it would be inconsistent to say that that which 
stays the same over time also varies over time.  In this way, endurantism, unlike perdurantism, 
appears not to be suited to the changing of objects over time in a consistent manner.  If one 
would like to preserve the mind-independence of change, the standard account of persistence 
offered by the B-theoretic, block universe therefore seems to be a better option than the standard 




The discussion so far has furnished a basis from which to think that the B-theoretic, block 
universe presents a more successful overall semantic and ontological account of time than A-
theoretic, dynamic accounts.  Even if one agrees both that the majority of scientific and 
metaphysical considerations fall on the side of a B-theoretic, block universe and that the 
experiential considerations do not decide between the two views, one might nonetheless still 
lament the idea that the passage of time is mind-dependent.  Can it really be the case that time 
would not pass without conscious beings?  Is it plausible to separate mind-independent change 
from mind-independent temporal passage such that the first can exist without the latter?  Is there 
no way to detangle the faulty account of mind-independent temporal passage endorsed by A-
theoretic, dynamic accounts from the idea of the mind-independent passage of time in itself, such 
that the mind-independent passage of time can be made compatible with the B-theoretic, block 
universe?  Those who are largely convinced by the arguments in support of the B-theoretic, 
block universe and yet not completely comfortable boldly asserting that the passage of time is a 
figment of conscious minds might be left fumbling for some way to reconcile the mind-
independent passage of time with the B-theoretic, block universe.   
 Taking a page from Mauldin (2007), one way to combine the B-theoretic, block universe 
with the mind-independency of temporal passage would be to argue that the mind-independent 
passage of time is a brute fact about the world that does not require any explanation.  The 
obvious downside of this route is that it makes the passage of time a very mysterious 
phenomenon.  The only answer that can ever be given to questions connected to why it is that 
time really passes will be that time just does in fact really pass and there is nothing more to be 
said on the matter.  A more illuminating path might be to, following theorists such as Mozersky 
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(2015) and Savitt (2009), advance a minimalist account wherein the explanation of and basis for 
mind-independent temporal passage is found in and consistent with the non-dynamic nature of 
the B-theoretic, block universe.  If it could be shown that such an account is able to capture key 
aspects of our experience of time, then a positive – and not just a neutral – case could be made 





















NON-DYNAMIC TEMPORAL PASSAGE 
 
1. Introduction. 
Within the philosophy of time, it has traditionally been the case that those who believe time 
really passes also think that the passage of time is a dynamic phenomenon (see Markosian 1992).  
While I want to argue that time really passes, I believe that the passage of time is not a dynamic 
process.  This may seem like a counterintuitive view.  What does it even mean to say that 
temporal passage itself involves no movement, flow, or becoming?  My aim is to take some 
initial steps in providing a satisfactory answer to this question.   
 I start by introducing the two broad camps with a stake in the debate over the status of 
passage: dynamic theories and the block universe.  My suggestion will be that, while there is 
reason to favor the ontological framework of past, present, and future provided by the block 
universe, neither the standard versions of dynamic theories nor the standard formulation of the 
block universe offer a satisfactory account of temporal passage.  In place of these standard 
views, I will argue for a non-dynamic account of the mind-independent passage of time that is 
compatible with the block universe.  In order to pre-empt claims that the non-dynamic account of 
temporal passage I offer is worrisomely disconnected from our experience, I outline some 
similarities between our pre-theoretic understanding of the passage of time and a non-dynamic 
account.   
 With some of the general features of a non-dynamic view of temporal passage in hand, I 
next introduce and defend my favoured non-dynamic account.  According to the rudimentary 
version of this account, the mind-independent passage of time is a matter of entities and events 
being temporally located farther from or closer respectively to the high entropy and the low 
73 
 
entropy boundaries of our block universe, whereupon time passes for an entity or event E insofar 
as it has an extended temporal existence.  Importantly, my non-dynamic account will end up 
being a very sparse view of passage, which adds nothing of metaphysical weight to the basic 
block universe.  It will find the basis for mind-independent temporal passage in the structural 
resources and contingent modal features of the block universe we happen to inhabit.  I conclude 
by considering some of the implications of and a potential issue with my account of the mind-
independent and non-dynamic passage of time. 
 
2.  Does Time Really Pass? 
Most philosophers will presumably allow that there is a sense in which time passes.  There is, 
though, no universal agreement concerning the nature of such passage.  Dynamic theorists 
typically hold that temporal passage is mind-independent (see Prior 1962).  Block universe 
theorists, on the other hand, usually argue that it is mind-dependent (see Price 1996).   
All dynamic theorists will hold that there is an active aspect to time.  The active nature of 
dynamic theories is why they are coined ‘dynamic’.  Defence of the mind-independency of 
temporal passage is linked with the belief that time has an active nature insofar as it objectively 
flows, progresses, or, say, renews itself.  That is why dynamic theories often go together with the 
mind-independency of temporal passage.  Another key characteristic of dynamic theories is that 
they give ontologically special status to the present.  The present, so it is claimed, is in some 
significant sense more real than either the past or the future and it is the present that does the 
flowing, progressing, or renewing.  Dynamic theories are often intertwined with the A-theory.  
As a result, dynamic theories are standardly committed to there being genuine A-properties such 
as being present and being future.  Since entities and events are constantly becoming less and 
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less future, then present, and then more and more past, entities and events are continually 
changing with respect to their A-properties.  Examples of dynamic theories include presentism 
(see Bourne 2006), the moving spotlight theory (see Skow 2009), and the growing block theory 
(see Broad 1923)19.  These views are generally thought to accord well with common-sense.   
Denial of the mind-independency of temporal passage is accompanied by the suggestion 
that the movement of time is an illusion, perhaps a figment of conscious minds.  Defending the 
equality of all times, the block universe theory is a model of ontological fairness that conceives 
of time as one dimension of a four-dimensional universe wherein the past, present, and future all 
exist.  Although they are independent theories, the block universe is frequently associated with 
the B-theory20.  Block universe theorists who champion the B-theory will find themselves 
devoted to the fundamental reducibility of A-properties to the B-relations of earlier than, 
simultaneous with, and later than.  In contrast to dynamic theories, the block universe theory 
arguably fits better with our best physical theories than our everyday discourse (see Dainton 
2010).  The block universe is commonly thought to be supported by special relativity insofar as it 
is strongly suggested by the relativity of simultaneity, for example.  The relativity of simultaneity 
tells us that sometimes there are no absolute facts about whether two events happen at the same 
time. This is in tension with the idea that there is an absolute present, an already-completed past 
and an as-yet unreal future, but it fits well with the block universe.  Some have proposed that 
certain dynamic accounts can be formulated so as to be compatible with theories such as special 
 
19 Presentism holds that only the present exists and time passes insofar as the present changes or renews itself.  
According to the moving spotlight theory, the past, present, and future all exist and time passes as the “illuminated” 
present moves from the past to the future.  The growing block view posits that only the past and present exist and 
time passes as the present edge of the block expands bringing the non-existent future into existence. 
20 Silberstein et al. (2018) offer a helpful discussion of the relationship between, on the one hand, dynamic theories 
and the A-theory and, on the other, the block universe and the B-theory.  
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relativity21.  Yet, when it comes to the specialness of present moments and the dynamic passage 
of time, the block universe and our fundamental physics are widely taken to be on the same page 
(see Silberstein et al., 2018).  Both do without positing anything like the objective, ontologically 
special present that is required for a flowing or moving picture of time itself22.   
Where does all of this leave us?  Is there a way to provide a consistent view that does not 
relegate temporal passage to mind-dependency and is based in the metaphysical view often 
thought to be the most compatible with the science of our world?  I believe that we can in fact 
offer a coherent account of the mind-independent passage of time in the block universe.  Toward 
this end, my primary task in what follows will be to argue for a revised version of the standard 
block universe view of the passage of time.   
 
3. The Mind-independent and Non-Dynamic Passage of Time. 
One thing to note at the outset is that the reason why the block universe theorist typically denies 
that the passage of time is a real feature of our world is that they follow the dynamic theorist in 
supposing that the passage of time must be a dynamic phenomenon.  Since, without even getting 
into the complications with trying to supply a coherent account of dynamic passage, there is no 
room for genuine movement or becoming in the “static” block, the block universe theorist has no 
option but to reject the mind-independent passage of time and instead relegate temporal passage 
to the mind.   
 
21 Skow (2009) argues that the moving spotlight theory can be made compatible with special relativity and Hinchliff 
(2000) claims that presentism is a tenable view even in a relativistic setting, for instance. 
22 The idea being that both physics and the block universe lack many features associated with dynamic theories and 
our everyday conception of time.  While this general claim is presumably uncontroversial, it has been proposed that 
quantum mechanics may be more hospitable to such features than relativity (see Callender 2017).     
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In contrast to the standard block universe approach to temporal passage, my suggestion is 
that we should set aside some of our preconceptions of what temporal passage ought to be and 
instead look to the block itself for guidance.  Doing so, I believe that we will find that there is a 
ready, albeit perhaps not what we expected, account of the mind-independent passage of time 
that we have been overlooking, with our blinders on so to speak.  This is not to say that we must 
completely redefine the passage of time away from its use in our everyday language.  It is also 
not to say that the difference between dynamic and non-dynamic passage is merely a matter of 
definition.  It is, however, to say that when we throw into question and set aside certain features 
of our pre-theoretic dynamic notion of temporal passage, we are left with something akin to it, 
yet without many of its problematic characteristics.  
 
3.1. Some Initial Groundwork. 
One way to highlight the difference between the view that I will be arguing for and other 
possible views is to point out its place within the available options for the fundamental nature of 
the passage of time.  These options include: 
 
The passage of time is: 
Mind-Independent  
Dynamic  
The passage of time is: 
Mind-Independent 
Non-Dynamic 
The passage of time is: 
Mind-Dependent 
Dynamic 







My aim is to argue for the option in the top right column.  This option finds little support within 
the literature and the version of it that I defend below is by and large a novel contribution.  As it 
is defended by the standard A-theoretic, dynamic theorist, the option in the top left column is 
difficult to reconcile with both the science and metaphysics of our world.  The option in the 
bottom left column finds strong opposition from our experience.  While the bottom right column 
is an open option, I am not aware of anyone who has defended such a view and I will not be 
examining it here.   
 Although in the minority, there have been B-theorists who have followed the standard A-
theoretic, dynamic theorist and argued for a version of the top left column – the view that the 
passage of time is mind-independent and dynamic.  Maudlin (2007), for instance, is a block 
universe theorist who defends what: 
 
 …ought to be a most uninteresting conclusion, but one that has somehow managed to 
 become philosophically bold: time does pass. Its passage is not an 'illusion' or 'merely 
 the product of our viewpoint' or 'an appearance due to our special mode of perception'. Its 
 passage is not a myth. The passing of time may be correlated with, but does not consist 
 in, the positive gradient of entropy in the universe.  It is the foundation of our 
 asymmetrical treatment of the initial and final states of the universe. And it is not to be 
 reduced to, or analyzed in terms of, anything else. (p. 142) 
  




 The passage of time is an intrinsic asymmetry in the temporal structure of the world, an 
 asymmetry that has no spatial counterpart. It is the asymmetry that  grounds the 
 distinction between sequences which run from past to future and sequences which run 
 from future to past. (…) The passage of time underwrites claims about one state 
 'coming out of' or 'being produced from' another. (p. 108/110) 
 
The view that I will present below takes a page from of Maudlin in that it is a block universe 
theory of time which argues that time really passes.  My view will also draw a close connection 
between the entropy gradient of the block universe, the asymmetry in the boundary conditions of 
the block universe, and the passage of time.  Nevertheless, there are a few notable differences 
between a view like Maudlin’s and the view that follows.    
Maudlin claims that the passage of time is a fundamental and irreducible fact about the 
structure of our block universe.  In contrast, one of my main aims is to provide a plausible 
account of the underlying basis for the mind-independent passage of time in the block universe.  
Doing so, it is hoped, will remove some of the mysteriousness inherent in positing that the 
passage of time is a brute fact about the world.  Another difference is to be found in Maudlin’s 
characterization of the passage of time as underwriting states “producing’ or ‘coming out of’ 
other states.  While Maudlin maintains that time itself does not move or flow, his talk of 
production does seem to introduce an active and dynamic element into the temporal dimension of 
the block universe.  The account that I will offer is strictly in line with the standard formulation 
of the block universe, and thus contains no active or dynamic elements.  Lastly, in defining the 
passage of time as an intrinsic asymmetry of the temporal dimension, Maudlin arguably equates 
the passage of time with the direction of time.  Although I do agree that there is a close 
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connection between the passage and direction of time, my argument will ultimately be that the 
passage of time supplies the explanatory basis for the direction of time. 
As a way to mitigate potential concerns that any account of non-dynamic passage will be 
worryingly disconnected from our ordinary usage of the term ‘temporal passage’, it might help to 
set out some connections between our everyday, pre-theoretic usage of the term and a non-
dynamic usage.  It is presumably uncontroversial to say that our ordinary usage of ‘temporal 
passage’ is both motivated and underwritten by our experience of the passage of time.  If this is 
the case, then any similarities between our ordinary usage and a non-dynamic usage of the term 
‘temporal passage’ will also serve to highlight a correspondence between our experience and the 
non-dynamic passage of time.  Demonstrating such a correspondence is important because it 
shows that the non-dynamic theorist can use the metaphysics of our world to account for aspects 
of our experience of time.  Since one of the major objections advanced against the standard block 
universe picture of the passage of time is that it endorses a metaphysical picture that runs afoul 
of our experience of time, a non-dynamic account of the mind-independent passage of time could 
help the block universe theorist with one of its main historical stumbling blocks. 
The primary difference between our pre-theoretic conception of temporal passage and a 
non-dynamic conception of temporal passage is that the former both incorporates dynamic 
language and meshes well with a dynamic way of viewing the world, while the latter is both 
articulated in non-dynamic language and suited to a non-dynamic world.   The two conceptions 
are therefore working from inherently disparate paradigms.  Despite this difference, there are 
central aspects of our pre-theoretic notion of temporal passage that can be captured by a non-
dynamic account.  In order to show that this is in fact the case, I next outline seven 
commonalities between our pre-theoretic conception of the passage of time and a non-dynamic 
80 
 
conception of the passage of time.  Both views should be taken to be mind-independent analyses 
of temporal passage.    
Starting with pre-theoretic connotations surrounding the passage of time, it seems to me 
that the following holds true: 
 
Pre-theoretic understanding of the term ‘temporal passage’:  In looking to provide a working 
definition of what it means to say that time passes, it seeks to describe the mechanism by which 
time passes.  In no particular order, some of the key features of this mechanism include: 
 
(I)  It is a phenomenon whereby moments get taken up from the future and added to the past. 
(II)  A standout feature of it is that the present is of momentary and fleeting duration. 
(III)  It cannot be put to a halt and its workings are irrevocable. 
(IV)  It offers a way to distinguish that which belongs to the present from that which belongs 
to the future or the past. 
(V)  Anything that exists in time and has duration experiences it. 
(VI)  It acts as a signpost to count the years, days, and minutes (i.e. the moments) of 
existence. 
(VII)  It is distinctive to time and is something that distinguishes it from space. 
 




Non-dynamic understanding of the term ‘temporal passage’:  Also seeks to describe the 
mechanism by which time passes.  Supposing that tensed language can be reduced to a tenseless 
meta-language23, some of the key features of this mechanism include: 
 
(I)*  It is a phenomenon whereby more time can be said to be earlier and less later (i.e. 
time is added to the past and subtracted from the future). 
(II)*  The now is of a finite and limited extension. 
(III)*  It exists eternally and tenselessly. 
(IV)*  It offers a way to distinguish that which is earlier from that which is later (i.e. to 
distinguish that which belongs to the present from that which belongs to the future or the 
past) 
(V)*  Anything that is extended in time experiences it. 
(VI)*  It acts as a signpost to distinguish the years, days, and minutes (i.e. the moments) 
of existence. 
(VII)*  It is distinctive to time and is something that distinguishes it from space. 
 
A point worth stressing is that the difference in the paradigms behind (I)-(VII) and (I)*-(VII)* 
underscores the idea that by definition no non-dynamic account will ever be able to supply 
metaphysics that directly account for our experience that days “flow”, hours “drag on”, or that 
the progress of time itself cannot be “stopped”.  If this is what one demands of a theory of 
passage, then the only available options are going to be the A-theoretic, dynamic ones.  What a 
non-dynamic account can offer is way to identify other basic aspects of our experience of 
 
23 More will be said on this below. 
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temporal passage in the world itself.  This is enough to conclude both that non-dynamic passage 
directly vindicates central features of our experience of time and that our experience of time 
gives support to non-dynamic passage.  The experiential import of non-dynamic passage is 
therefore a clear improvement over the illusory accounts of temporal passage proposed by 
traditional block universe theorists.             
Excepting (III) and (III)*, the similarities between (I)-(VII) and (I)*-(VII)* are all 
seemingly straightforward.  (I) and (I)* capture the feeling that the passage of time acts as the 
umpire of the past, present, and future.  (II) and (II)* correspond to our experience that the 
present is limited in duration.  (IV) and (IV)* get at the feeling that without the passage of time it 
would make little sense to say that there is a difference between that which is present, that which 
is past, and that which is future.  (V) and (V)* support the experience that if something exists in 
time, then it will undoubtedly be subject to the passage of time.  (VI) and (VI)* connect to our 
conventional use of the passage of time in accounting for the time that is given to us.  (VII) and 
(VII)* buttress our experience that, while time passes, space does not pass.  The connection 
between (III) and (III)*, however, is a bit winding.   
(III) holds that the passage of time is a phenomenon that cannot be stopped24 and that the 
influence it has cannot be changed or reversed.  That the passage of time cannot be stopped 
according to our common understanding of it seems clear.  While it may feel like some moments 
drag on forever and others speed by much too quickly, I do not think anyone would seriously 
propose that a defining feature of the workings of temporal passage is that it can be stopped and 
started on command, at will, or even randomly.  It also seems central to our understanding of the 
passage of time that it cannot be flipped or altered.  We neither believe that we are able to wake 
 
24 Here we might want to add the caveat that this holds for matter travelling at subluminal speeds. 
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up one morning to the experience of moments that have passed awaiting our future experience 
nor think that temporal passage can be shuffled or mixed up insofar as a random moment that has 
passed, for example, can suddenly make an appearance in the present in any form other than 
recollection.   
(III)* proposes that the passage of time is a phenomenon that is essentially untensed and 
exists as it does, in its totality, eternally.  To say that the passage of time is a tenseless 
phenomenon is simply to say that it neither relies on nor brings about an ontologically 
fundamental distinction between absolute and objective notions of past, past, and future.  
Although we may in general find it easier and more intuitive to talk in terms of past, present, and 
future, it is important to keep in mind that these notions do not, according to the block universe 
theorist, strike a real divide between three distinct aspects of time.  Instead, as long as the block 
universe theorist is also a B-theorist, what is past can be reduced to that which is earlier than a 
given moment, what is present can be reduced to that which is simultaneous with a given 
moment, and what is future can be reduced to that which is later than a given moment25.  
Reducing tensed language to a tenseless metalanguage, we end up with a semantic view wherein 
the truth value of our propositions is had simpliciter rather than at times (as would be the case 
with a tensed semantics).  Given that propositions have their truth value simpliciter, a proposition 
does not change its truth value over time.  An instance of such a reduction would be reducing the 
tensed sentence “It snowed today” to the tenseless sentence “It snowed on 29 December 2017”26.   
On a tenseless picture, the passage of time is therefore fundamentally connected to the earlier 
 
25 I will address why it is plausible to assume that the block universe theorist will also be a B-theorist in section 4. 
26 Although it is not a topic I will be focusing on in this project, for more on the semantics of time see, for instance, 
Farkas (2008), Mozersky (2015), or Prior (1968). 
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than relation27.  What, though, might it mean to say that the passage of time is a phenomenon 
that exists eternally?    
The reading of ‘eternal’ that I want to endorse is one wherein an eternal entity is an entity 
that exists throughout all time.  If time has a beginning and an end, then such an entity exists 
from the beginning to the end of time.  If time has no beginning or end, then such an entity exists 
forever28.  According to this reading, the eternally existing totality of events and facts that makes 
up our world exists at every moment.  Importantly, this does not mean that events such as the 
snowstorm of 2015 exist in every moment, but rather that at every moment the totality of events 
and facts which they form a part of exists.  This coincides well with the idea that the block 
universe is itself “all there”.  If this is indeed the right way to interpret the eternal existence of 
the four-dimensional block, it should also be the correct way to understand the passage of time in 
the block.  The reason for this is that the passage of time would, as a feature of the eternally 
existing temporal dimension, also be itself eternally existing.  If this is the case, then what is 
meant by the claim that the passage of time exists eternally is that it is a phenomenon that exists 
throughout all of time.   
Bringing everything together, the main similarity between (III) and (III)* rests in the 
binding and unremitting nature that both ascribe to the passage of time.  For, just as (III) 
proposes that the passage of time is an irrevocable phenomenon that continues as long as there is 
 
27 As with the relation between the block universe and the B-theory, I will have more to say on the nature of this 
connection in section 4. 
28 See Oaklander and Smith (1995) for a detailed discussion of the various ways to understand the notion of 
‘eternal’.  Oaklander and Smith ultimately endorse a reading of eternal wherein an eternal entity, while not 
independent of time, exists apart from it.  Such an entity contains time within it and yet does not exist in time itself.  
A full analysis of Oaklander and Smith’s account would take much more room than there is space for here.  
However, in short, their understanding of eternal existence seems flawed to me insofar as it implies that events, such 
as my finishing Life and Fate in 2017, do not exist in time but rather merely contain time.  This understanding of 
eternal is arguably at odds with the block universe, which holds that all entities and events that make up the totality 
of entities and events are ontologically on par.    
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time, (III)* holds that the passage of time is an eternally existing phenomenon relating the 
permanent ordering of moments along the temporal dimension of the four-dimensional block.   
These opening thoughts are meant to provide some initial general clarification of what it 
might mean to say that the passage of time is both mind-independent and non-dynamic.  I now 
turn to the specifics of my account of the mind-independent and non-dynamic passage of time in 
our block universe.   
 
3.2. MNDP. 
There are a few points worth re-emphasizing about the account of mind-independent and non-
dynamic temporal passage that follows: 
 
➢ First, it is motivated by both the block universe picture of time and our experience of 
time. 
➢ Second, it accepts the block universe as the correct account of the fundamental ontology 
of space and time.  It neither adds to nor augments the basic four-dimensional manifold 
that is the block. 
➢ Third, it is a very sparse account of temporal passage.   
 
With these provisos, we can start by marking a distinction between two ways of thinking of the 




View from Nowhen: This is the view which encompasses the entire block universe itself 
and stands outside the block with all of the moments that make up the block spread out 
before it.  It is the ‘eternalist’ viewpoint of the block. 
 
View from the Block: This is the view of an observer from within the block.  It has to go 
through the moments one by one and experiences the moments as would, say, a human 
being.  It is the everyday, experiential viewpoint of the block.  
 
Neither the View from Nowhen nor the View from the Block are meant to be literal 
interpretations of a perspective which is able to view the block universe.  They are, instead, 
meant to be devices which serve to highlight that there is an important difference between 
thinking of the block sub species aeternitatis and thinking of the block from a vantage point 
within the block itself.  Another way to draw the contrast is to say that the View from Nowhen is 
a way to think about the content of the block that does not change between differing temporal 
perspectives, while the View from the Block is a way to think about the content of the block that 
is relativized to a temporal frame of reference29.  
While all of time can be said to have “passed” if you are thinking of it from the View from 
Nowhen, it has, from any individual point in the manifold itself, not all passed (i.e. time can still 
be said to be “running its course”).  As a result, although the passage of time is a single 
phenomenon, there will be two different ways to describe it depending on which perspective we 
are considering it from.  Nevertheless, I want to argue that from either perspective the reality is 
that the passage of time is a mind-independent and non-dynamic phenomenon that exists 
 
29 See, for instance, Ismael (2015) for further discussion on the general idea behind the distinction between the View 
from Nowhen and the View from the Block. 
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eternally and tenselessly.  Below is the general structure that I want to propose for such an 
account.   
The embarkation point is an asymmetry that is brought out by the explanatory power inherent 
in the temporal boundary conditions of the universe (see Maudlin 2007).  Assuming that the 
fundamental physical laws of our world are deterministic, in order to give an account of the total 
state of the world we will need both the laws and the boundary conditions.  I will work from the 
model that: 
 
Boundary Q:  Q is in a state of very low entropy and as we work in time from Q to R 
entropy increases. 
Boundary R:  R is in a state of high entropy and as we work in time from R to Q entropy 
decreases. 
   
As a way to present my view of passage as simply as possible, I am for the moment assuming 
that our block universe is fully temporally bounded.  I will, however, have more to say about the 
boundedness of space-time when I address some of the potential issues with my account in 
section 4.   
To see the explanatory import of the relationship between the boundaries we can begin by 
noting that, in order to account for the actual world, we need the constraints we place on 
whichever boundary we choose to determine the other boundary to be specifiable apart from 




 …in order to account for the universe as we see it, we need more than the laws: we need 
 a constraint on one of the boundaries.  That constraint, together with the operations of the 
 laws, then suffices to account for the nature of the other boundary.  But in order for this 
 to work the constraint must itself be specifiable independently of what will result from the 
 operation of the laws.  (p. 132) 
 
What Maudlin is pointing out is that we are able to determine, with relative freedom, the 
conditions of one of the boundaries by both specifying the constraints on the other boundary and 
finding a unique global solution to the laws.  The boundary that is to determine the other 
boundary, however, cannot be reliant on the determined boundary together with the laws of 
nature since, in order for it to be the determining boundary, its conditions must be identifiable 
independently of any sort of temporal evolution of the laws themselves.   
 Applying the explanatory asymmetry of the boundaries to Q and R, it turns out that Q 
meets the requirements for a determining boundary while R meets the requirements of a 
determined boundary.  Remembering that Q is in a state of very low entropy and R is in a state of 
very high entropy, the idea underlying the explanatory asymmetry between Q and R is further 
brought out by Maudlin in the following (Ibid): 
 
 The initial state is atypical because it has low entropy, i.e. because it occupies (relative 
 to the natural measure) a very very very small volume of phase space.  One can 
 characterize this atypicality without any mention at all of how such a state will evolve.  
 The final state, however, is microscopically atypical in a way that can only be 
 characterized in terms of how it will ‘evolve’ through time.  It is microscopically atypical 
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 because temporal evolution in one direction from it will lead, over a very long period of 




 Even though the laws themselves might run perfectly well in reverse, even though the 
 time reverse of the final state might give rise to the time reverse of the initial state, we 
 cannot specify an independent, generic constraint on the final state that will yield 
 (granting the final microstate is atypical) ever decreasing entropy in one direction.  (…)  
 The atypical final state is accounted for as the product of an evolution from a 
 generically characterized initial state in a way that the initial state cannot be explained as 
 a product of evolution from a generically characterized final state.  (p. 133) 
 
Although Maudlin speaks in terms of initial and final states and for the moment I want to avoid 
temporally ordering the relationship between Q and R, Q fits the specifications of the initial state 
and R fits the specifications of the final state.  The constraint we placed on Q – namely, that it is 
in a state of very low entropy – is a condition that will not come about as a result of R and the 
laws.  The constraint we placed on R – namely, that it is in a state of very high entropy – will 
come about as a result of Q and the laws.  This is because we can explain a state of high entropy 
from the laws together with the assumption of a state of very low entropy.  We are not, on the 
other hand, able to explain a state that is in very low entropy from the laws together with the 
assumption of a state of very high entropy.  To see why there is this asymmetry in the 
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explanatory power of Q and R, we need to say a bit more about the second law of 
thermodynamics.   
 Classical thermodynamics makes it a necessary truth that entropy increases.  This means 
that it rules out the possibility of occasional, isolated instances of entropy decrease.  The 
statistical definition of entropy is equivalent to the classical thermodynamic definition of entropy 
to within Boltzmann’s constant30.  Applying statistical methods to the thermodynamics of large 
systems of particles, we end up with the result that it is overwhelmingly likely that the entropy of 
an isolated system will increase over time.  This is because, according to statistical mechanics, 
entropy is a measure of the probability of the distribution of the microstates of a macroscopic 
system.  The greater the probability of the arrangement of the microscopic states of a 
macroscopic system, the higher the entropy.  Seeing as there are many more disordered than 
ordered microscopic states31, the odds are extremely high that from any temporal slice of an 
isolated system the entropy of that system will increase.  From here on, I will be working with a 
statistical reading of entropy in the second law and the assumption that our universe is itself an 
isolated system32.     
     Connecting the second law to the explanatory power of the temporal boundaries of our 
world, we end up with the following: 
 
(i) According to the second law it is overwhelming likely that from any temporal slice 
the entropy of our world will increase. 
 
30 k=R/NA (where R = the gas constant and NA = the Avogrado constant). 
31 We could also put this in terms of thermal energy available to do work or information available, instead of 
referring to the order and disorder of a system. 




(ii) Boundary Q is in a state of very low entropy.  
(iii) As we work away from Q in time entropy increases. 
(iv) Boundary R is in a state of high entropy. 
(v)  As we work away from R in time entropy decreases. 
(vi) Combining (i), (ii), and (iii), we have a consistent way to explain (iv). 
(vii) Combining (i), (iv), and (v), we do not have a consistent way to explain (ii). 
 
From (i)-(vii), it follows that the explanatory resources of our world are powerful from Q to R 
but not from R to Q. 
My account so far has two pieces: 
 
➢ The distinction between the View from Nowhen and the View from the Block 
➢ The asymmetry in the explanatory power of Q and R 
 
At this juncture, it may rightly be wondered what these two features have to do with the passage 
of time.  The answer is that, assuming that the “static” temporal dimension of the block is 
extended beyond a single moment of time, combining the View from Nowhen – the view from 
which all times are equally real – with the explanatory asymmetry in the temporal boundary 
conditions of our world should lead us to conclude that time passes from Q to R and not from R 
to Q.  To see why this is, we can start by noting that the passage of time supplies the overall 
difference between past-to-future and future-to-past.  Given that time passes from Q to R, the 
past-to-future runs from Q to R.  If time were to pass from R to Q, then the past-to-future would 
run from R to Q.  To this we can add the idea that the explanatory relationship between Q and R, 
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which works from Q to R but not from R to Q, is one wherein the explanans is always in the past 
of the explanandum insofar as the explanans is the antecedent condition for the explanandum.  
Hence, if the passage of time is that which distinguishes past-to-future from future-to-past and if 
the explanatory asymmetry between Q and R runs from past-to-future, then time must pass from 
Q to R and not from R to Q.         
In what follows, my task will be to expand on and defend the details of this analysis of 
the connection between, on the one hand, the View from Nowhen, the View from the Block, and 
the asymmetry in the treatment and explanatory power of Q and R and, on the other hand, the 
mind-independent and non-dynamic passage of time.  I start by providing a working definition of 
what I mean by the mind-independent and non-dynamic passage of time.  I then home in on why 
it is that the passage of time is the appropriate mechanism by which to differentiate past-to-future 
from future-to-past.      
The account of the mind-independent and non-dynamic passage of time that I want to 
defend is: 
 
The Mind-independent and Non-dynamic Passage of Time (MNDP): From any 
moment M within the block universe there is time between M and Q and M and R (unless 
M is the moment at either end of the block).  If there is more time between M and Q than 
there is between M and R, then more time can be said to have passed than if there is less 
time between M and Q than there is between M and R.  Time passes for an entity or event 





Applying MNDP to the distinction between the View from Nowhen and the View from the 
Block: 
 
MNDP and the View from Nowhen:  From the perspective of the View from Nowhen, all 
moments of time are equally real and accessible, i.e. all of time is spread out before this 
view.  There is a distinction of the block between Q and R, and, viewing time sub specie 
aeternitatis, the view from Nowhen can “view” all of time passing.  There is a sense, 
then, in which we can say that for the View from Nowhen all of time has passed.       
 
MNDP and the View from the Block:  From the perspective of the View from the Block, 
the present moment is experienced as real while the past and the future are felt to be in 
some significant sense less real than the present.  This view gets at the intuitive view of 
an observer in the block.  If the View from the Block has any sort of continued existence 
beyond a moment, then there will be moments that it has visited and moments that are 
still to be visited.  As long as its existence is extended beyond a single moment in the 
block, time passes for the View from the Block. 
 
In turning toward an answer to why it is that the passage of time supplies a distinction 
between past-to-future and future-to-past in the block, we can begin by noting that when we 




(a) The idea that all of time is equally real and there is a difference in the treatment and 
explanatory power of the boundary conditions needed to produce the actual block 
universe we inhabit. 
 
With the claim that: 
 
(b) More time has passed if we are closer to boundary Q than boundary R (as described 
above), while less time has passed if we are closer to R than Q.  Time passes for an entity 
when it exists at more than one moment M of time. 
 
We end up with: 
 
(c) If an entity or event E exists at all moments MI, MII, and MIII and from E’s frame of 
reference: 
 
• MI is closer to Q than R in relation to MII and MIII 
• MII is closer to R than Q in relation MI 
• MII is closer to Q than R in relation to MIII 
• MIII is closer to R than Q in relation to MI and MII 
 
then, insofar as less time has passed for E when is it is closer to Q than when it is closer to R, 
moments closer to Q than MI will be in the past for E while moments closer to R than MIII will 
be in the future for E.  While this is the general idea, it should be noted that we could be more 
95 
 
specific by stating exactly which moment MI, MII, or MIII from which we are considering E.  
From what has been said, we can define past-to-future versus future-to-past as: 
 
Past-to-future vs. future-to-past:  The past-to-future for E is from MI to MIII and the future-
to-past for E is from MIII to MI insofar as the following is true: 
 
(i) The above relations between MI, MII, and MIII and Q and R hold. 
(ii) The passage of time is a phenomenon whereby more time resides in the past as more time 
passes and less time resides in the future.  
 
(ii) was an undefended supposition first introduced during the discussion of the link between our 
pre-theoretic understanding of temporal passage and non-dynamic temporal passage.  It is meant 
to be taken as an intuitively appealing general feature of the passage of time.  The claim being 
that an important and defining characteristic captured by both our everyday, pre-theoretic 
thinking and a non-dynamic account is that the passage of time not only marks a distinction 
between what is past and what is future but provides us with information about how much time 
has passed for any given entity or event.  Remembering that all talk of ‘past’ and ‘future’ reduces 
down to the earlier than relation, we can get an idea of how much time has passed in connection 
to an entity or event E between moments MA and MB, for instance, by referencing the amount of 
time between MA and MB in relation to Q and R.   
One might object that (ii) builds the direction of time into the definition of the passage of 
time.  In reply, it can be pointed out that there does indeed appear to be a close connection 
between the passage and direction of time.  While I do not want to say that this connection is one 
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wherein the direction of time is contained within the passage of time, I do think that they are not 
independent phenomena.  I will have more to say about this relationship below, but at this point I 
want to emphasize that, rather than being a worry, this potential concern with (ii) actually seems 
to get at something important about the nature of time.  
In sum, in being the mechanism by which more or less time can be said to be past or 
future, the passage of time informs us of the amount of time that is in the past and the amount of 
time that is in the future in relation to the frame of reference of any given entity or event.  The 
distinction between past-to-future and future-to-past is therefore defined by referencing the 
passage of time with respect to the frame of reference of any given entity or event E.  As a result, 
there is no absolute past, present, or future according to MNDP.  In line with special relativity, 
that which is considered past from one frame of reference may be past, present, or future from a 
different frame of reference.               
Figure 3 offers an illustration of MNDP as exhibited by E’s existence in the block: 
 
 
   Q            R 
(TQ)        E1E                  (TR)  
 
   
MI    MII     MIII 
 
 




Figure 3: MNDP33.  Less time has passed for EA than for EB and EC.  More time has passed for 
EB than EA and less time has passed for EB than EC.  More time has passed for EC than for EB and 
EB
34.   
 
As previously noted, MNDP is a very minimal statement of the passage of time.  It is, 
nevertheless, rich enough to supply substantial answers to the following three pivotal questions 
about temporal passage:   
 
 
➢ What is the basis of the passage of time?   
➢ What does the passage of time itself amount to? 
➢ What does the passage of time explain?     
 
The first question asks what, if anything, explains the passage of time.  Is there something to 
which we can point that underlies temporal passage?  Whether it turns out to be reducible to facts 
about the psychology of human beings, facts about the fundamental ontological structure of the 
world, or even a brute fact in itself, every theory of the nature time must, if it is to be an adequate 
theory, offer some commentary on the basis of the passage of time.  The exposition provided by 
MNDP is that the passage of time, as a real feature of our world, has a basis in both the necessary 
ontological structure of the block universe (i.e. the framework of spacetime provided by the four-
 
33 Picking out the location of EA, EB, and EC is not meant to separate the block into an absolute, objective, and 
universe-wide division between MI, MII, and MIII.  Instead, pointing at the temporal location of EA, EB, and EC in the 
block should be treated indexically.   
34 EA, EB, and EC can be thought to represent either separate entities/events or different temporal parts of an 
entity/event E.   
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dimensional manifold) and the contingent features of the block we find ourselves inhabiting (i.e. 
the boundary conditions and the entropy gradient).   
 The second question asks for a description of the passage of time.  How might we 
succinctly characterize temporal passage?  According to MNDP, the answer to this question is 
extremely simply, perhaps deceptively so.  It follows from MNDP that the passage of time itself 
amounts to the occupation of entities and events at successive moments in the block, whereupon 
more time has passed for an entity or event E at temporal locations of its existence that are closer 
to the high entropy boundary than the low entropy boundary and less time has passed for E at 
temporal locations of its existence that are closer to the low entropy boundary than the high 
entropy boundary.  Time passes for E so long as E has an extended temporal existence in the 
block.  There will be a difference in description depending on whether we are thinking of 
temporal passage from the View from Nowhen or from the View from the Block.   
The View from Nowhen “sees” the world as a global permanent arrangement of entities 
and events existing at different moments of spacetime.  All of these entities and events, if they 
have any temporal extension, will exist in fixed relations both with their own temporal slices and 
the temporal slices of other entities and events.  Since the View from Nowhen is a – fictional – 
perspective of the entire block, it will have a global view of the temporal dimension and will 
therefore conclude that temporal passage is a unified phenomenon that encompasses everything 
that is to be found in time.  The View from Nowhen, consequently, informs us that time passes 
for an entity or event E as E changes – in a non-dynamic sense35 – its temporal position in the 
block.  The View from the Block, on the other hand, provides a local perspective on temporal 
passage.  If this view belongs to a conscious observer, then we can say that time passes as 
 
35 I will expand on this notion in section 4. 
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conscious experience changes.  If this view belongs to an event or a non-conscious entity E, then 
we can say that time passes as E undergoes either an internal change or an external change with 
respect to its relation to other entities or events. 
 The third question asks about the significance of the passage of time.  What work does 
temporal passage do in accounting for and helping us to understand the world?  The answer 
according to MNDP, which has been described in detail above, is that the passage of time 
explains the distinction between past-to-future and future-to-past in our block universe.  This, in 
turn, allows us to make sense of claims along the lines of: A is earlier than B, A is simultaneous 
with C, and B is later than C.  Given that it explains why there is a difference between that which 
is earlier and that which is later in our block universe, MNDP also provides a plausible 
explanation for why our world just so happens to have a temporal dimension that is directed.  
There are two steps to the connection MNDP draws between passage and direction: 
 
Step 1:  The passage of time explains the distinction between past-to-future and future-to-
past.  This means that it explains the difference between earlier-to-later and later-to-
earlier. 
Step 2:  Time has a direction insofar as some moments and their accompanying entities 
and events come earlier than other moments and their accompanying entities and events.  
The arrow of time is thus grounded in the asymmetry provided by the earlier than 
relation. 
 




 Conclusion:  The passage of time provides an explanation for the direction of time. 
 
Furnishing the explanatory basis for both the earlier than relation and the direction of time, the 
account of temporal passage contained within MNDP is explanatorily powerful.  
  
4. Implications of and a Potential Concern with MNDP. 
I begin this section by addressing some of the implications that follow from MNDP’s description 
of temporal passage and its account of the explanatory significance inherent in temporal passage.  
I then consider and respond to a potential concern for MNDP that arises from its treatment of the 
basis for temporal passage. 
 
4.1. Implications of MNDP. 
There are two substantial implications of MNDP that are worth highlighting.  First, MNDP 
suggests that there is a very close connection between the passage of time and change.  Second, 
if the block universe theorist is a B-theorist, they are going to want to endorse MNDP rather than 
the standard block universe account of temporal passage.  While the first implication may seem 
innocuous or even fitting, the second implication is apt to strike some readers as distasteful. 
  The relationship between the passage of time and change contained within MNDP is 
brought out by its description of temporal passage.  If the passage of time itself simply amounts 
to entities and events occupying different moments at different times in the block, then the 
passage of time is either identical to non-dynamic (a.k.a. B-theoretic) change or is in some way 
essential for such change.  Non-dynamic change holds that what it is for something to change is 
merely for it to have one set of properties at one time and a different set of properties at an earlier 
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or a later time.  For instance, at time T1 a light is red and at a later time T2 the same light is 
green.   
Given both the description of temporal passage proposed by MNDP and the definition of 
non-dynamic change, I want to argue that the following are characteristics of the relationship 
between the passage of time and change:   
 
• The passage of time is not identical with change 
• The passage of time is necessary for change 
• Change is sufficient for the passage of time 
 
These three characteristics are arguably a prima facie attractive way of thinking of the 
connection between the passage of time and change.  Upon quick reflection, there does seem to 
be something agreeable in the idea that the passage of time and change are distinct phenomenon.  
One might, for instance, try to ground this contrast in the idea that change belongs both internally 
to entities and events and to the external relationship that holds between entities, events, and 
their surroundings, while the passage of time belongs solely to the world at large.  That the 
passage of time is necessary for change finds support from the plausible claim that things around 
us and, indeed, the world itself would not undergo change if time did not pass.  Lastly, that 
change is sufficient for the passage of time might be said to come from our sense that if there is 
change, then surely time must pass.  Although these initial thoughts on temporal passage and 




 According to MNDP, the reason that the passage of time is distinct from change is 
grounded in the explanatory import of temporal passage.  Granted that the passage of time is the 
basis for the earlier than relation and given that change requires the earlier than relation, the 
passage of time and change cannot be one and the same thing.  Stated another way, the passage 
of time, insofar as it marks the differentiation between past-to-future and future-to-past, allows 
for the distinction between that which is earlier and that which is later while, since non-dynamic 
change is fundamentally a matter of properties being had at one time that are not had at an earlier 
or later time, change depends upon their being a way to differentiate that which is earlier from 
that which is later.   
The explanation of the distinction between the passage of time and change offered by 
MNDP also contains the answer as to why passage is necessary for change and change is 
sufficient for passage.  If, on the one hand, change relies on the earlier than relation and if the 
passage of time supplies the earlier than relation, then change will require the passage of time, 
and hence there will be no change without the passage of time.  If, on the other hand, change is a 
matter of entities and events having different properties at one time than they did at earlier or 
later times and if the passage of time itself boils down to the occupying of entities and events at 
different moments in the block, a difference in the properties belonging to an entity or event E at 
one time in comparison to E at an earlier or later time will be enough to conclude that E resides 
at different moments in the block.  Importantly, the argument is not that the passage of time is 
the cause of E’s having different intrinsic properties.  Rather, the claim is that the passage of 
time brings about a change in the extrinsic relational properties of entities and events, which may 
also be accompanied by a change in the intrinsic non-relational properties of entities or events. 
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In concluding the discussion of the first implication, it is worth mentioning that the 
standard block universe theorist will agree that the passage of time is a distinct phenomenon 
from change.  They will, though, want to allow for non-dynamic change in a world wherein the 
passage of time is mind-dependent.  This means that they will strongly disagree with both the 
claim that the passage of time is necessary for change and the claim that the passage of time is 
sufficient for change.  Nevertheless, if these claims are, as I have suggested, consistent with both 
the block universe we happen to inhabit and supported by our experience of the world, then 
MNDP will have a clear advantage over the standard version of the block universe.  Not only 
will it be able to provide an account of the block universe that vindicates important features of 
our experience that time really passes, it will provide a justification for the feeling both that 
change would not occur unless time passes and that there is change where time passes.    
The second implication that follows from MNDP’s description of and commitment to the 
explanatory significance of temporal passage is that the block universe theorist, assuming they 
are a B-theorist, should be motivated to accept MNDP.  The connection between MNDP and the 
B-theory rests in the earlier than relation.  Since they are committed to the irreducibility of the 
tenseless earlier than, simultaneous with, and later than ordering of the B-series, the B-theorist 
will only be able to endorse a theory that can account for the fundamentality of the earlier than 
relation.  MNDP provides such a theory.  Further, if MNDP’s claim that the passage of time 
provides the mind-independent basis from which to distinguish that which is earlier from that 
which is later is correct, then the passage of time, in providing the general basis for the earlier 
than relation, is essential to a key aspect of the B-theory.  The standard version of temporal 
passage in the block universe would not meet the demands of the B-theory since it holds that the 
passage of time is mind-dependent.  The B-theoretic block universe theorist should, then, prefer 
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MNDP to the standard block universe account of temporal passage since they are going to want 
to find a mind-independent way to distinguish that which is earlier from that which is later and 
this means that they are going to need to find an objective grounding for the earlier than relation.  
At this point, it may be countered that there is no reason to presume that the block 
universe theorist will also be a B-theorist.  Why can the block universe theorist not, for instance, 
commit to the existence of the four-dimensional block while denying that the moments in the 
block are related by the earlier than relation?  What I want to suggest is not that there is no way 
for one to be a block universe theorist without being a B-theorist.  That line of reasoning would 
seem to be plainly misguided seeing as one might, for example, combine the block universe with 
some sort of moving spotlight that divides the block into the A-theoretic tensed distinctions of 
absolute past, present, and future.  What I do want to propose is that it is reasonable to assume 
that the block universe theorist will most likely also be a B-theorist.  The block universe provides 
a becoming home for both the eternalist continuum and the relational earlier than, simultaneous 
with, and later than ordering of the B-theory.  In addition, unless they are willing to accept that 
no moment, event, or entity is earlier, simultaneous with, or later than any other moment, event, 
or entity, the earlier than relation will be given a place in the block universe theorist’s account of 
time.  Without such a distinction, the block universe theorist would be left with something akin 
to McTaggart’s C-series insofar as they would have a series stripped of its temporal relations.  
This would leave them unable to account for mind-independent change, a situation in which 






4.2. A Potential Concern for MNDP. 
Seeing as it relies heavily on the temporal boundaries, one potential issue for MNDP surrounds 
the question of what becomes of the status of temporal passage if our world happens to either not 
be fully temporally bounded or to be infinite in spatiotemporal extent.   
One way for the world to be temporally unbounded would be for one of the 
spatiotemporal ends of the block to be unbounded.  This would be the case if one of the ends of 
the block was a singularity while the other was infinite in extension.  This option would coincide 
with a cosmological model such as the Big Bang theory.  Evidence for a big bang comes from 
the ‘red shift’ phenomenon, which tells us that the universe is expanding.  The implications of an 
expanding universe being such that (LePoidevin, 2003): 
 
If galaxies are receding from each other, then they can hardly have been doing this 
forever.  Suppose we are watching a vastly speeded-up film of the universe running 
backwards.  What we see are galaxies getting closer and closer.  Eventually, all matter is 
concentrated into a tiny space.  Now we run the film forwards and we have a picture of 
what was memorably described by the British cosmologist Fred Hoyle as ‘the Big Bang’.  
(…)  Thus the red shift phenomenon provided evidence (now regarded as equivocal) that 
the universe had a beginning. (p. 75) 
 
While this account of the Big Bang nicely portrays the event in question, in order to fully 
harmonize it with the block universe we would have to keep in mind that there is no active 
receding or coming into being.  All that the block universe provides us with is a set array of flip-
book-like moments composing the block.  All dynamic talk is thus relegated to a potentially 
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useful metaphorical device.  Neither observationally supported nor as widely endorsed as the Big 
Bang theory, the other option for a partially unbounded universe is a cosmological model along 
the lines of the Big Crunch theory.  Exactly how such a model would play out in a block universe 
is an interesting question.  If the block was only bounded on one end by the Big Crunch and 
infinite spatiotemporally on the other end, we might imagine there being a reversal in the metric 
expansion of space at some point in the block which leads to a cosmic scale factor of zero.   
 Regardless of which end of the block we posit as bounded and irrespective of how we 
end up describing the end which is bounded, MNDP can be slightly modified to fit with a 
partially bounded block universe.  So long as there is an objective distinction between the 
bounded and unbounded ends of the block, we can use this difference to orient the non-dynamic 
passage of time on the manifold.  As a way to demonstrate how it is that non-dynamic temporal 
passage and a partially bounded block universe are compatible, I will again bring in boundaries 
Q and R.  As a reminder: 
 
Boundary Q:  Q is in a state of very low entropy and as we work in time from Q to R 
entropy increases. 
Boundary R:  R is in a state of high entropy and as we work in time from R to Q entropy 
decreases.   
 
Let us assume, then, that we have two universes: 
 
Universe 2:  Universe 2 is bounded on one end by boundary Q and infinite in 




Universe 3:  Universe 3 is bounded on one end by boundary R and infinite in 
spatiotemporal extension at the other end. 
 




  Q               ∞ 
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Figure 5: MNDP in Universe 3.   
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In order to demonstrate how MNDP works in universe 2 and universe 3 we need to find a 
basis for the orientation of the non-dynamic passage of time in the two universes.  In universe 2, 
there is one end of the block that is in a state of very low entropy from which the overall entropy 
of the universe increases as we get farther away from it and one end of the block that is 
unending.  Given this depiction of universe 2, we might wonder if and how it is possible for 
entropy to increase without end.  Would it not be the case that universe 2 would eventually reach 
thermodynamic equilibrium?  The right response here seems to be that, even if universe 2 
reaches thermodynamic equilibrium, time and space can nevertheless continue infinitely.  The 
objective distinction between Q and the infinite end of the block, which allows us to place the 
non-dynamic passage of time in universe 2, would also remain.  Along the same lines as our 
original universe, which was bounded by Q and R, if universe 2 is to amount to the familiar 
world we see around us and we want to be able to explain it as such, then MNDP must operate 
from Q to ∞ and not from ∞ to Q.  Adapting MNDP to universe 2, we end up with: 
 
The Mind-independent and Non-Dynamic Passage of Time in Universe 2 (MNDP2): 
From any moment M within block universe 2 (except the moment at end Q) there is time 
between M and Q and time between M and ∞.  If there is more time between M and Q, 
then more time can be said to have passed than if there is less time between M and Q.  
Time passes for an entity or event E insofar as it exists for and occupies more than one 




Stated another way, the idea behind MNDP2 is that the closer an entity or event E is temporally 
to Q the less time will have passed for E and as E is located temporally farther from Q the more 
time will have passed for E.  What about universe 3? 
 As with universe 2, we can begin by positioning the passage of time in universe 3.  The 
only difference between universe 2 and universe 3 is that universe 2 is partially bounded by Q 
while universe 3 is partially bounded by R.  This means that in universe 3 what we have to work 
with is a boundary that is in a state of high entropy from which entropy decreases rather than a 
boundary that is in a state of low entropy from which entropy increases.  The opposite concern 
that arose for universe 2 arises for universe 3.  How can it be that entropy infinitely decreases?  
Once again, the way that universe 3 can avoid this issue is similar to the way that the opposite 
concern was avoided in the case of universe 2.  Specifically, supposing that the entropy of 
universe 3 has reached the lowest point possible, if time and space can both continue to exist in 
such a state, then there does not seem to be any worry that ∞ can in fact not be infinite36.  
Continuing to the passage of time in universe 3 and applying the reasoning we used in the case of 
universe 2 to universe 3, MNDP will tell us: 
 
The Mind-independent and Non-Dynamic Passage of Time in Universe 3 (MNDP3): 
From any moment M within block universe 3 (except the moment at end R) there is time 
between M and R and time between M and ∞.  More time can be said to have passed if 
there is less time between M and R than if there is more time between M and R.  Time 
 
36 This discussion, however, does seem to be more in line with a substantivalist metaphysics of spacetime and that 
might be a worry for some. 
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passes for an entity or event E insofar as it exists for and occupies more than one moment 
M between ∞ and R.   
 
Turning the reasoning used in universe 2 on its head, the idea behind MNDP3 is that the closer 
an entity E is temporally to R the greater will be the amount of time that has passed for E, and as 
the temporal location of E is situated farther from R the less time will have passed for E.  
 Another way for the world to be unbounded would be for both ends of the block to be 
unbounded.  Notwithstanding that the name ‘block universe’ would seem somewhat unfitted to 
it, we can outline such a world as: 
 
Universe 4:  Neither end of universe 4 is bounded.  It is limitless in spatiotemporal 
magnitude. 
 
We are not able to rely on either Q or R to help guide us in placing the non-dynamic passage of 
time in universe 4.  We can, though, think about the nature of universe 4 and the character of its 
infinite spatiotemporal extent.  Instead of focusing on the relation between M and Q and R as we 
did when considering universe 2 and universe 3, in universe 4 we might be able to appeal to the 
relation between M and the temporal expanse surrounding M.  The following line of thought uses 
the relationship between M and its temporal surroundings to place MNDP in universe 4:        
 
The Mind-independent and Non-Dynamic Passage of Time in Universe 4 (MNDP4): 
From any moment M within block universe 4 there is time between the maximum 
entropy state and the minimum entropy state.  If there is less time between M and the 
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minimum entropy state of the universe, then less time can be said to have passed and if 
there is less time between M and the maximum entropy state, then more time can be said 
to have passed.  Time passes for an entity or event E insofar as it exists for and occupies 
more than one moment M between the minimum and the maximum entropy state of 
universe 4. 
 
In short, MNDP4 holds that the closer an entity or event E is temporally to the overall minimum 
entropy state of universe 4 the less time will have passed for E and the closer E gets to the 
maximum entropy state the more time will have passed for E.   
Figure 6 offers a depiction of MNDP4. 
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Figure 6. MNDP in Universe 4.  
 
One difference of note between MNDP, MNDP2, MNDP3, on the one hand, and 
MNDP4, on the other, is that as it stands MNDP4 is a rougher account of the passage of time 
than the other three views.  What is meant by this is that MNDP4’s reliance on overall minimum 
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and maximum entropy states provides a less specific way to determine how much time has 
passed for any given entity or event than the boundaries utilized by MNDP, MNDP2, and 
MNDP3.  In particular, we might want to know exactly which areas within the overall maximum 
and minimum entropy states of universe 4 are to be referenced if the amount of time that has 
passed for any given entity or event E is to be determined.   
Two responses can be made to the vagueness inherent in MNDP4.  If we are content to 
have a bit of inexactness in our account, we could embrace the indefiniteness of MNDP4 and 
stipulate that enough information is garnered by ascertaining whether, for a given entity or event 
E, more or less time in general has passed.  This might be done by referencing the overall 
minimum and maximum entropy states of universe 4 in broad strokes.  If we would rather a more 
precise account, we could specify a fixed reference point within the overall minimum and 
maximum entropy states of universe 4 in relation to which the passage of time is always to be 
understood and measured.  No matter which alternative is preferred, the point to take away is that 
there are ways to deal with MNDP4’s seeming problem with imprecision.    
 
5. Conclusion.   
My goal has been to build on the conception of temporal passage incorporated by the most 
influential theories within the philosophy of time.  The account on offer is based in the ontology 
of the block universe theory yet follows dynamic theories in positing that the passage of time is a 
real feature of the world.  Contra dynamic theories, however, it conceives of this passage as non-





CONCLUDING THOUGHTS  
 
 
While the four papers presented here are on different themes and may serve as stand-alone 
projects, they are connected by the overarching goal to understand the nature of time at its most 
fundamental level.  The first two papers offer a negative appraisal of existing theories in the 
philosophy of time.  Temporal Passage in a Fragmented World suggests that neither tensed nor 
tenseless understandings of fragmentalism can furnish a coherent basis for the mind-independent 
passage of time.  Norton’s Objective Temporal Passage maintains that Norton’s block theoretic 
inspired account of the mind-independent passage of time is ultimately burdened with more 
issues than benefits.  The second two papers offer a positive addition to the existing literature in 
the philosophy of time.  A Defense of the B-Theoretic, Block Universe presents an overview of 
some of the foundational issues found in the literature on time and argues that the weight of these 
considerations supports the B-theoretic, block universe over A-theoretic, dynamic accounts.  
Non-Dynamic Temporal Passage introduces a largely novel view of the passage of time in the 
block universe, which finds grounds for mind-independent temporal passage in the ontological 
resources of the standard block universe.          
 Work on these four papers has left me with many new and unanswered questions.  Taking 
the papers in turn, some of these questions include: 
 
Temporal Passage in a Fragmented World: 
➢ Can we make sense of the mind-dependent passage of time in a fragmented world? 
➢ How might Fine respond to Lipman’s tenseless fragmentalism? 
➢ If none of the standard theories in the philosophy of time can clearly produce a winning 
account of the passage of time, how are we to decide between them? 
➢ How might fragmentalism be able to account for our everyday experience of time? 
 
Norton’s Objective Temporal Passage: 
➢ How does Norton’s view compare to other block universe views that hold that time really 
passes, such as Maudlin’s and the view I present in Non-Dynamic Temporal Passage? 
➢ How might we further defend the view that the passage of time is not an illusion since it 
shares none of the main features of familiar illusions? 
➢ What else might psychological studies of time perception have to tell us about the 
possible illusory status of the passage of time? 
➢ Does humanity share the same pre-theoretic understanding of time?  How might factors 







A Defense of the B-Theoretic, Block Universe: 
➢ What else do scientific theories other than SR and GR, such as quantum mechanics, tell 
us about the passage of time? 
➢ Which of the A-theoretic, dynamic views is the most compatible with the science of our 
world? 
➢ How might the B-theoretic, block universe theorist who is an endurantist respond to my 
claims about the relationship between perdurantism and the B-theoretic, block universe?  
➢ How ought we weight experiential, scientific, and metaphysical arguments?  For instance, 
should our experience of time count for more, the same as, or less than scientific 
considerations of time? 
 
Non-Dynamic Temporal Passage: 
➢ Does MNDP entail that there are some possible block universes where time does not 
pass?  If so, which universes will these be specifically and is such an implication a 
downside of MNDP? 
➢ What does MNDP have to say about causation?  How might this relate to MNDP’s views 
on the direction of time and the entropy gradient? 
➢ What more might MNDP have to say in accounting for our dynamic experience of time?  
What support can it find from psychological studies of time perception? 
➢ How else might MNDP deal with worries that it merely offers a redefinition of the 
passage of time and neither a substantial nor viable account of true temporal passage? 
 
Inspired by some of the lingering questions left open from Non-Dynamic Temporal Passage, I 
have been working on a paper called Experience and Non-Dynamic Temporal Passage.  My aim 
in this paper is twofold.  First, present and argue for the claim that my version of the mind-
independent and non-dynamic passage of time in the block universe is able to provide 
metaphysical grounds for important aspects of our experience of time unaccounted for by the 
metaphysics of the standard block universe account of temporal passage.  Second, offer a 
psychological motivation and explanation of the features of our experience of temporal passage, 
such as its dynamic character, that are not captured by my non-dynamic account.  Accomplishing 
these two aims will take me deeper into both the phenomenological and psychological aspects of 
temporal passage.  From this basis, I would like to develop a project on the general explanatory 
relationship between, on the one hand, the physical and metaphysical foundation and, on the 
other hand, the experiential and psychological output of a theory of time.  My goal will be to 
show how psychological and experiential facets of time can be directly explained by their 




Lastly, one of the side issues that I have been interested in throughout the process of my writing 
is the practical implications that might follow from and connect with our scientific and 
metaphysical basis of time.  Along these lines, I have been putting together a paper Freedom in 
the Block that argues against the possibility of any conception of free will capable of grounding 
responsibility in the block universe that we inhabit.  Following theorists such as Double (2000), 
Smilansky (2002), and Pereboom (2001)37, I suggest that libertarian free will is an illusion.  
Unlike many of these other theorists, however, I propose that questions of free will and 
responsibility can be answered apart from any considerations related to determinism and 
indeterminism.  Specifically, I aim to show that, whether or not determinism is true at the 
microscopic and macroscopic levels, the macroscopic world in which we reason and act is 
constrained by the ontology of time afforded by the block universe.  It is this ontological 
structure of time that precludes both libertarianism and any type of compatibilism able to sustain 
our everyday, intuitive notion of responsibility.  While this project is still evolving, my tentative 
conclusion is that, given the block universe that we inhabit, we ought to believe and act as if free 
will and responsibility are not genuine features of the world.  Nevertheless, I think that 
responsibility and punishment can come apart to a certain extent, and thus there may still be 
justifiable non-retribution-based repercussions for behavior that is harmful and destructive.  An 
interesting line of inquiry that results from this conclusion concerns the psychological basis for 
the illusions of free will and responsibility.  In the end, the best way to understand free will and 
responsibility in the block universe might be to draw an analogy between these two notions and 












37 Double, R. (1990).  The Non-Reality of Free Will.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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